Sunday, July 20, 2014
U.S. counterterrorism agencies finding potential homegrown extremists in U.S.
Monday, September 12, 2011
What the Secret Neighbors Do: Look for Terrorist Threats, Share the Information to Thwart Them
Three times a day officials sit in a windowless secure video conference room in one of McLean's most secure buildings and give other high-ranking officials around the government a rundown of the most prominent terrorist threats facing the U.S.
The first briefing of the day occurs at 1 am. The biggest occurs at 8 am. The last at 3 pm. The building works like a factory with three shifts a day.
These briefings are central to the job description of the National Counterterrorism Center, one of McLean's newest secret neighbors, spawned directly from the ashes of 9-11.
Sunday we told you the story we pieced together of how the NCTC and the Director of National Intelligence became our neighbors. Today we'll tell you what they say they do.
Within the sprawling intelligence community, the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) was formally established in 2004 to bring together all available information on
terrorism, analyze the information, and warn of potential attacks on the U.S.
One of the most painful findings after 9-11, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies didn't talk to each other.
What they don't do: The Center’s work excludes terror that is exclusively domestic. The FBI does that. NCTC says they don't do operations. They simply collect data, analyze and share it.
They also create the "watch lists" also called No Fly lists.
"We are one of the bright shining stars in the post-9-11 environment," said NCTC spokesman Carl Kropf.
The Washington Post reported last year that some blamed the NCTC for failing to undercover a man before he boarded a Northwest Airlines flight and attempted to blow it up as it was landing in Detroit on Christmas Day.
The NCTC and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), were created to force the 16-agency intelligence community to share information in ways that eluded it leading up to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
As the central repository for "all-source" intelligence on international terrorism, the NCTC is supposed to find the important dots, connect the dots and advise the government on threats, the Postexplained.
"We are to connect and make sense of an unbelievable amount of information we receive about plots and threats" from foreign intelligence sources, from the military, and a myriad of other sources," Kropf explained.
"There is an unbelievable amount of data in our world and the ability to understand what is relevant and important and to make those judgements as quickly as possible," is what the agency does, he said.
The NCTC command center brings together staffers from the FBI, the Department of Defense, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Homeland Security, etc.
In a large two-story room filled with 16-20 desks arranged in pods of four, analysts watch information flowing into the three screens on their desk. The room looks like a sound stage with "movie" lights hanging from the ceiling. That's because it was designed by a set director from the Disney company, McLean Patch was told during a recent tour.
A huge TV screen dominates the front of room. When visitors come the screen shows CNN.
The folks sitting at the desks come from the "partner" agencies. "This is part of breaking down the walls . . . they are really in the same room. . . You walk to your (intelligence) colleagues 20 feet over there," said the command center administrator. "This is a real example of how the barriers have broken down on counter terror."
Who's in Charge
The director of the NCTC reports to both the President of the United States and to their next-door neighbor, the Director of National Intelligence.
Vice Adm. John Redd was the first director of the National Counterterrorism Center, in August 2005. He resigned in November 2007 because he needed replacement surgery on both knees, which would require a prolonged absence if he were to stay as director, Carl Kropf was quoted as saying.
He was succeeded by his deputy Michael Leiter, who was confirmed in 2008 and departed this summer.
Matthew G. Olsen was sworn in as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in August following his confirmation by the U.S. Senate.
Olsen is the top attorney at the National Security Agency, which is responsible for cracking enemy communications and encrypting ours, and he’s also a law professor at Georgetown University, according to the New York Daily News. He's now our new neighbor.
James R. Clapper, Jr. was sworn in as the fourth Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on August 9, 2010. He is a retired lieutenant-general of the U.S. Air Force.
As DNI, Mr. Clapper oversees the United States Intelligence Community and serves as the principal intelligence advisor to the President.
Remembering Their Roots
The NCTC contains a permanent 9-11 Memorial.
A glass case on the first floor holds a large piece of limestone from the Pentagon. A flag that flew over the ashes of the World Trade Center. A piece of twisted stell from the World Trade Center.
"We do this for our families, our community and for our nation," said Kropf.
We pray that they succeed.
Tuesday, May 03, 2011
US Intelligence Victory
The U.S. Intelligence Community has taken a lot of flak - some of it deserved - since the Nine Eleven attacks. Now those same organizations have something very big to show for their work in the killing of Osama Bin Laden.
Often we are told in Washington, D.C. that U.S. Intelligence can't publicly talk about how an attack was prevented, or how the U.S. avoided some kind of terror troubles.
But this one is more than just a high profile success story - it's the most wanted terrorist on the face of the planet.
"Since 9/11, this is what the American people have expected of us, and today, in this critical operation, we were able to finally deliver," said a Senior Administration Official a few hours after Bin Laden had been killed.
"The operation itself was the culmination of years of careful and highly advanced intelligence work. Officers from the CIA, the NGA, the NSA all worked very hard as a team to analyze and pinpoint this compound," he added.
But even after identifying the compound, there was no guarantee that Bin Laden was really there, or that he had even been there at some point.
"The bottom line of our collection and our analysis was that we had high confidence that the compound harbored a high-value terrorist target," said another senior official.
"The experts who worked this issue for years assessed that there was a strong probability that the terrorist that was hiding there was Osama bin Laden."
The cooperation among intelligence agencies enjoyed further synergy with the Joint Special Operations Command, which conducted the Bin Laden raid, showcasing even more improvement in the way that intelligence is dealt with by the Intelligence Community.
Remember, one grand lesson of Nine Eleven was that U.S. intelligence featured a lot of turf wars and a lack of intelligence sharing.
Don't get me wrong - there are still turf wars and infighting - but in this case, the system seemed to work as we might well have imagined.
“Bin Laden’s death is a major milestone in the global war on terrorism," said Scott Redd, a former director of the National Counterterrorism Center during the Bush Administration.
"It’s the results of years of patient and painstaking work by an integrated intelligence community and was brought to conclusion by the kind of interagency teamwork which was put in place after 9/11."
Can that continue? The struggle is by no means over.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Tuesday, March 08, 2011
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Vice President Dick Cheney interview
Visit msnbc.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economy
Saturday, September 25, 2010
In Defense of the West—and the Third Way; In today's world, a progressive party that stands essentially for big government is not going to succeed.'
Tony Blair believes in "Islamist extremism."
It's U.N. week, and the former British prime minister is in town as the representative of the Quartet—the U.S., Russia, the EU and the U.N.—that aims to broker Mideast peace. We are in his suite at a posh Upper East Side hotel, talking about a passage in his just-published memoir in which he discusses the reach of the radical Islamist "narrative." It's a narrative, he argues, that needs to be "challenged head on."
This prompts me to ask whether he thinks that the widespread reluctance to use the word "Islamist" alongside the word "extremist" is a kind of evasion from reality.
"I think it is, I'm afraid," Mr. Blair answers, deploying the famously elegant diction that used to make for such invidious contrasts in the days when he shared a podium with George W. Bush. By way of explanation, he turns to the recent, aborted attempt by Florida Pastor Terry Jones to burn the Quran.
"I have no difficulty in saying this person is a Christian pastor but I completely and totally disagree with him," he explains. "It's fascinating, though, that when that happens the whole of the Western leadership have to come out and denounce it. . . . Let's say some cleric in some remote part of Pakistan turns up and says, 'I'm going to burn the Bible tomorrow.' What would we all say?"
Mr. Blair has been out of office for more than three years, but he is still sounding the same themes that were the touchstones of his decade in office. He is still faithful to the Third Way school of politics, still believes that government should be for empowerment not entitlement, and is still fighting a rear-guard action against fellow "progressives" who think it ought to be the other way round. But above all, Mr. Blair remains seized by the scope of the challenge posed by radical Islam.
"I think there is a tendency to regard the activities of the extremists who use terrorism and suicide bombings and so on as this small group of people unrelated to the broader [Muslim] community in which they exist," he says. "And I feel that narrative penetrates a lot deeper. And if you can't take that narrative on, you are left in a position where you end up semi-apologizing for your own position in relation to these things. And I think that's dangerous."
The narrative, as Mr. Blair describes it, consists of the view that the West is in cahoots with its client regimes in the Middle East—not just Israel, but also countries like Pakistan, Egypt and the Gulf emirates—to oppress Muslims and denigrate Islam. That narrative has its own subscribers among Western leaders and opinion-makers who believe the right approach is to say, in Mr. Blair's mocking paraphrase, "We kind of understand why you feel like this about us and maybe it's our fault but, you know, let's try and work this out."
Mr. Blair has little patience with this view: It rubs him wrong not only because he believes the analysis is flawed and the prescription misguided, but also—and here I'm reading between the lines—because it suggests Muslims should be held to a different set of standards and values.
Yes, he says, the Muslim world needs "genuine demonstrations of equality, respect, partnership and so on." That's one reason, he adds, why he puts so much stock in the Israeli-Arab peace process. But Mr. Blair also stresses that what the Muslim world—or at last the modernizing forces within it—need from the West is "for us to be really strong about our own confidence in our position, our own way of life and the values we represent."
Part of that confidence is affirming the rightness of what the U.S., Britain and the rest of the Coalition of the Willing did in Iraq—and what they continue to do in Afghanistan. Regarding the so-called occupation of Iraq, Mr. Blair notes that from the middle of 2003 coalition forces were in the country "with full U.N. authority." The international community followed up with billions in aid to the country. Democratic elections were held; Iraqis indicated the kind of future they wanted for their country.
And then the effort nearly fell apart on account of the unremitting savagery of Baathist holdouts, al Qaeda recruits, and Iranian-backed militias. Mr. Blair would like to know why Iraq's tormentors should be let off the hook while its liberators are vilified. "For us to end up in this situation where people say this is an indication that you should never have gone there, that you should have just let Saddam stay—we really need to think about what we're saying when we're saying that."
Mr. Blair feels the same way about the apportionment of blame in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He is confident of the good intentions of both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (about whom, he adds, he is "absolutely sure [he] would sign a deal"). But he is also mindful of the way Israel is mindlessly castigated in the West, "particularly in Europe," for its every misstep, real or alleged.
"You cannot refuse to accept that Israel has a genuine security problem," he insists. "What does it mean when, the other day, President Obama launches the [Israeli-Palestinian] talks in the White House . . . and Hamas kill those [Israelis], including a pregnant woman and the parents of six children, and then put out a statement saying that this is an heroic act of courage? What does it say of the nature of what we're up against?"
Mr. Blair is equally emphatic about the need to confront Iran, which in his memoir he treats as morally equivalent to al Qaeda. Though he says he agrees with President Obama's approach to the regime—summed up as "here's a hand of friendship and now it's your choice"—he is under no illusions about the threat Iran poses. He is particularly enraged at the role it played in Iraq, including the supply of IEDs to insurgent forces that killed British and American troops. Might things in Iraq have gone better had the coalition confronted Iran's meddling sooner than it did? "I think that's a very, very good question," he replies.
The interview turns to the subject of Tehran's nuclear program. Could an Iran with nuclear weapons be contained, I ask, as it is now so fashionable to argue?
"I wouldn't take that risk," he replies without hesitation. "It is perfectly possible that a nuclear-armed Iran might be contained. But I think it's impossible to guarantee that, and it so drastically changes the balance of power within the region that it's not responsible" to allow it.
I say that sounds like he'd be prepared to countenance military strikes if other options fail.
Mr. Blair hedges for a moment: "When I'm asked this, [I always] default to the traditional line, which is to say I don't think you can take any option off the table."
I press: "But it sounds like you actually mean it."
He comes back more firmly: "I do mean it. . . . The alternative is to say that you are prepared to contemplate [a nuclear Iran], which, by the way, the moment you send that signal makes it a lot more likely to happen. So I think it's perfectly possible that we can avoid the situation. But I think the stronger and clearer we are, the more likely we are to avoid it."
Mr. Blair's tenure in office—begun, as he accurately puts it in his memoir, as a veritable love affair between him and the British electorate—is widely believed to have soured precisely because he holds these foreign policy views and was willing to act on them. Given that the Labour Party in Britain and the Democrats in the U.S. have now turned their back on the Third Way politics that gave Mr. Blair and Bill Clinton their resounding electoral victories, I wonder whether those politics would not have been more in vogue today had it not been for Iraq.
Mr. Blair demurs. "People forget this, but the closest I came to losing my job in a [parliamentary] vote was actually over tuition fees [for university students], and not over Iraq. The most difficult things were . . . introducing private-sector [reforms] into the health-care system, introducing academy schools, the equivalent of charter schools, and law and order."
It's a useful reminder. When Mr. Blair and Gordon Brown first came to office, the New Labour moniker was widely suspected of being a kind of political marketing device rather than representing a real change of heart by a party that had once been a de facto subsidiary of Britain's trade unions. But if Mr. Blair's memoir is anything to go by, he for one was a sincere convert to the New Labour faith. Among other things, it explains his current opposition to high rates of marginal taxation.
"The most important thing is to encourage strong growth, for the economy to create wealth. And I just think this is a very basic point . . . you need tax rates that are competitive with the world in which we live and in which people's hard work and enterprise is rewarded." As for the notion that the purpose of progressive governance is to tax the wealthy and redistribute it to the rest, Mr. Blair urges caution: "The people you end up hitting are not the very wealthy, because in my experience the very wealthy can make their own arrangements."
Mr. Blair is similarly worried about the perils of excessive regulation. While he believes that governments were right to respond to the financial crisis as they initially did, he worries that the recovery runs the risk of regulatory strangulation. "How you stabilize the economy is not the same as how you then get it let out of the crisis and back to strong growth, where you will need the private sector to be enterprising, innovative and able to compete." Nor does he have any patience with the demonization of the financial sector as "the bad guys" in the crisis.
The question arises of how Mr. Blair—a prep school boy and Oxford graduate who came to the Labour Party more from its intellectually Fabian wing than from the trade union movement—came by his views. Partly it's to do with his own father's rise from working-class roots, and partly by the pre-political years he spent as a commercial and industrial-relations lawyer, where he learned that "most people aspire to do better and most people actually want their kids to do better than them—and these are actually great engines of growth and progress."
But he also says his views are informed by traveling to emerging economies such as China. "These are all places where, if we're not careful, they are going to learn the lessons of our development and, funnily enough, they're not going to replicate all those lessons. . . . They will learn from our successes as well as our mistakes. And if we're not careful, they are going to leave us behind."
So much of what Mr. Blair says is so consonant with the political right-of-center that I ask him if he doesn't feel closer to John McCain politically than to Barack Obama. He laughs it off, calling himself a straight "Democrat-Labour" kind of guy. But elsewhere in the interview he offers a political warning to his fellow progressives:
"In today's world, in the 21st century, a progressive party that stands essentially for the state and big government is not going to succeed. Simple as that." I wonder if anyone in the White House is listening.
Mr. Stephens writes the Journal's Global View column.
Monday, March 22, 2010
The Iran Problem with Hanson & Baer
The Iran Problem with Hanson & Baer: Chapter 5 of 5
How should Obama deal with both Iran and Israel? Victor Davis Hanson and Robert Baer summarize the options.
PERMALINK
| THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2009 The Iran Problem with Hanson & Baer: Chapter 4 of 5 Will Israel strike first against Iran? Victor Davis Hanson and Robert Baer discuss the politics and ramifications of this prospect. PERMALINK |
| WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2009 The Iran Problem with Hanson & Baer: Chapter 3 of 5 What can the U.S. do about Iran? Victor Davis Hanson and Robert Baer offer their prescriptions. PERMALINK |
| TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2009 The Iran Problem with Hanson & Baer: Chapter 2 of 5 Victor Davis Hanson and Robert Baer describe the motivations and goals of the regime in Tehran. PERMALINK |
The Iran Problem with Hanson & Baer: Chapter 1 of 5
Is the Iranian nuclear threat real? Victor Davis Hanson and Robert Baer say yes.
PERMALINK
War & History with Victor Davis Hanson
War & History with Victor Davis Hanson: Chapter 5 of 5
Victor Davis Hanson offers some insight into his life as a war historian — and more.
PERMALINK
| THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2010 War & History with Victor Davis Hanson: Chapter 4 of 5 Victor Davis Hanson talks about the study of war. PERMALINK |
| WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010 War & History with Victor Davis Hanson: Chapter 3 of 5 Victor Davis Hanson discusses error and war, including the errors made in the War in Iraq. PERMALINK |
| TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010 War & History with Victor Davis Hanson: Chapter 2 of 5 Victor Davis Hanson describes the several ways in which the American way of war is distinctive. PERMALINK |
War & History with Victor Davis Hanson: Chapter 1 of 5
Victor Davis Hanson explains why war is inseparable from the human condition.
PERMALINK
Wednesday, March 03, 2010
Sunday, February 14, 2010
Thursday, February 11, 2010
What Became of the 'Freedom Agenda'? President Obama can avoid his predecessor's mistakes without alienating the people of countries like Iran.
President Obama's recent drop in the polls has not been accompanied by a corresponding rebound in public opinion concerning the foreign policy of his predecessor George W. Bush. This is particularly true with regard to the promotion of democracy in the Middle East, or what the Bush administration called the "Freedom Agenda." The consensus of foreign-policy experts on the left and right now deems this a naïve initiative that was rightly abandoned by the Bush administration itself shortly after the rise of Hamas in the Gaza elections of 2006.
While Mr. Obama paid lip service to the need for greater Middle East democracy in his June 2009 Cairo speech to the Muslim world, he has done very little concretely to back this up in terms of quiet pressure for democratic change on the part of allies like Egypt, Jordan or Morocco. Indeed, the administration's ramping up of military support for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the wake of the attempted Christmas day airliner bombing suggests that we've gone back to the traditional U.S. policy of reliance on Arab strongmen.
This would be a big mistake. For the core premises of the Freedom Agenda remain essentially correct, even as its enunciation in the midst of the Iraq invasion undercut its credibility. Mr. Obama runs the risk of falling in bed with the same set of Middle Eastern authoritarians and alienating broad political populations in the region. He may even live to see them blow up in his face for lack of legitimacy, just as the Shah of Iran did in 1979.
The Bush administration asserted a number of points under the rubric of the Freedom Agenda that remain valid to the present moment. Back in 2003, President Bush said that "Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom . . . did nothing to make us safe. . . . As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export."
In his second inaugural in January 2005, Mr. Bush went on to say that there was no cultural reason why the Arab world should remain the one part of the world resistant to the broad wave of democracy evident everywhere else.
As a report published last month by the U.S. Institute of Peace, "In Pursuit of Democracy and Security in the Greater Middle East," argues, there are good reasons for thinking that the lack of democracy in the Arab world is political rather than cultural. Arab authoritarians like Hosni Mubarak of Egypt have tolerated—and in some cases promoted—the participation of Islamist candidates in elections as part of a strategy to prove to Western backers that they are the only thing standing in the way of cataclysmic Islamic revolution.
They've also gotten good at a cynical game of state-managed liberalization, whereby they open up their political systems just enough to convince outsiders that they are "transitioning" to genuine democracy, only to clamp down again once their control is threatened.
All of this has led, in the view of the Institute of Peace report, to an increasingly dangerous political, social and ideological gap between rulers and their societies. And in this struggle between state and society, the U.S. is widely seen throughout the region as selfishly propping up an unjust and corrupt old order.
The problem with the Bush administration's Freedom Agenda wasn't its fundamental analysis, but the way that it was articulated in the midst of the highly unpopular Iraq war. Democracy promotion was used from the start to justify the invasion, and in the eyes of many Arabs became synonymous with American occupation.
The high-flown rhetoric of Bush's second inaugural, when he asserted that there could be no difference between U.S. security interests and our democratic ideals, was manifestly hyperbolic and led to inevitable charges of hypocrisy when the U.S. failed to endorse Hamas as the sole representatives of the Palestinians in Gaza. By making Middle East democracy promotion an instrument of the war on terror, the U.S. both tainted the cause of democracy itself and undermined the credibility of its own foreign policy.
Mr. Obama arrived in office with none of this baggage, and therefore had an opportunity to recommit the United States to peaceful democratic change. But the window is rapidly closing as the U.S. draws closer to the region's authoritarian rulers. In Jordan, for example, cooperation on the war on terrorism has been accompanied by the regime's curbing of political freedoms through the passing of nearly 100 temporary new laws. This has not prevented Mr. Obama from telling King Abdullah "Your Majesty, we need to clone you."
The most immediate danger lies in Yemen, which has become the focus of counterterrorism efforts since the abortive Christmas day attack. There is a genuine al Qaeda threat in Yemen, but President Saleh has made his own situation worse by clamping down on popular protest in the south of the country and picking a fight with the Houthis in the north.
Putting family members in key positions, his corrupt regime nonetheless received nearly $70 million from the U.S. in military assistance last year and is scheduled for even more in the future. Rather than aggressively pressing Mr. Saleh to negotiate with opposition groups and broaden his base of support, we are repeating the classic mistake of putting all of our eggs in one authoritarian basket and making cooperation on counterterrorism the primary criterion for economic and political support.
Taking a Middle Eastern democracy agenda seriously does not mean that we should return to the loud trumpeting of promises of support for regional democracy that we cannot keep. Nor does it mean playing the authoritarians' game of affirming fake liberalization as the real article of democracy.
It does mean working quietly behind the scenes to push friendly authoritarians towards a genuine broadening of political space in their countries through the repeal of countless exceptional laws, defamation codes, party registration statutes and the like that hinder the emergence of real democratic contestation.
The longstanding risk that true democratization will lead to takeover by radical Islamists remains real; our ideals do not require us to commit suicide in this manner. But the idea that radicalism is the only alternative to an illegitimate status quo is one we need not accept.
Mr. Fukuyama, professor of international political economy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is author of "America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy" (Yale, 2006).
Tuesday, February 09, 2010
The Homegrown-Terrorist Threat
If 2001 was the year when international terrorism hit American soil, then 2009 was the year when Americans became the targets of domestic terrorism. In November, Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, born in Virginia to Palestinian Muslim parents, killed 13 and wounded 30 in his one-man attack on fellow soldiers at Fort Hood in Texas. The massacre, which Senator Joseph Lieberman properly labeled “the most destructive terrorist act to be committed on American soil since 9/11,” capped a year of terrorist plots or conspiracies inside the United States, most of which were stopped by law enforcement in their planning stages. The notable fact about all these cases is that they are examples of so-called homegrown terrorism—meaning that they were planned by individuals either born or raised in the United States and executed without significant assistance from overseas networks.
In October, the American-born David Coleman Headley, who had changed his name from Daood Sayed Gilani to disguise his half-Pakistani origins, was arrested for planning an attack on the Danish newspaper that published cartoons depicting Muhammad in 2006 and for providing assistance to the Pakistan-based terrorist group that carried out the 2008 Mumbai attacks in which 170 were killed. Two days after Headley was charged, Pakistani authorities arrested five Muslim men born and raised in and around Washington, D.C., for planning to take up arms against coalition forces in Afghanistan. The Washington Five were all college students, “fun-loving, career-focused children that had a bright future for themselves,” in the words of a youth coordinator who knew them.
On June 1, 2009, a 23-year-old Army recruiter in Little Rock was shot and killed by an African-American convert to Islam who, upon his arrest, began complaining about American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. A week before that, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, which coordinates some 40 local and federal law-enforcement agencies, arrested four men for attempting to shoot down military planes based at an Air National Guard base in Newburgh, New York, and detonate bombs at two synagogues in the Bronx.
Of the 30-odd attempted terrorist plots against the United States or American installations abroad that have been foiled since 9/11, roughly a third have been uncovered in the past year alone. What is new, and particularly frightening, about these recent attempts is that the budding perpetrators were initially indoctrinated inside the United States, with help from extremist websites or Islamic preachers. It was only after they had been brought some ways along the road to holy war that at least some of these would-be jihadists sought training and logistical support from al-Qaeda and others overseas.
This development has come as a surprise. It had become accepted wisdom that the openness of the United States and its acceptance of minority faiths and communities had helped to prevent the spread of the kind of Islamic radicalism that has gripped Western Europe over the past decade. Whereas European Muslims, many of them descendants of manual laborers imported from North Africa and the Middle East, comprise a ghettoized underclass and face great difficulty adapting to the rigid notions of European national identities, Muslims in the United States are, on average, better educated than most Americans and earn about the same amount.
In 2005, Spencer Ackermanof the New Republic trumpeted the seeming inoculation of American Muslims to jihadist enticement, concluding that “if the United States is looking for a way to win the hearts and minds of Muslims worldwide, it ought to first look at what it has accomplished at home.” Five years ago, Ackerman’s assessment seemed accurate. Today it seems complacent. Radicalization, we now know for a certainty, is happening here.
Indeed, it is happening here among those who would theoretically provide the evidence for Ackerman’s claim—Muslims born abroad who make their home in the United States. In September, Najibullah Zazi, a 24-year-old native of Afghanistan and legal resident, was charged with plotting to set off explosives against high-profile targets in New York City. Both Zazi and Betim Kaziu, a Kosovar Albanian who became a U.S. citizen and was indicted in September for conspiracy to commit murder abroad and provide material support to terrorists, turned to jihadism on American soil.
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In August 2007, the New York City Police Department released a report on the process of radicalization that leads to terrorist attacks. The study described an intricate four-step progression by which individuals, most likely to be Muslim men between the ages of 15 and 35, are led from their status as “unremarkable” citizens to would-be perpetrators of atrocities.
The process begins at a stage of “pre-radicalization” during which they are initially exposed to Salafism, an extremist form of Sunni Islam that commits its followers to the murder of infidels or those Muslims deemed insufficiently devout (Shiites, for example).
Next follows “self-identification,” a period in which the potential terrorist, usually catalyzed by a specific event, begins to disavow previously held worldviews and embraces the legitimacy of violent jihad. The third step is “indoctrination,” when, with the support of radicals in his ambit (usually imams or extremist peers), the individual becomes estranged from his former life and fully accepts Salafist ideology as his guiding purpose. Finally comes “Jihadization,” the operational phase of the process, when the budding terrorist takes part in training activities and the actual planning of terrorist attacks against specific targets. An Islamic upbringing or even prior knowledge of Islam is not necessary; indeed, most terrorists begin their lives with next to no Islamic identity whatsoever. In testimony late last year to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, the NYPD’s director of intelligence analysis, Mitchell D. Silber, stated that “the vast majority of individuals who end up radicalizing to violence do not start out as religiously observant or knowledgeable.”
At the time the 2007 report was released, the kind of homegrown terrorist plots that would surface with a vengeance in 2009 were few and far between—six men convicted of a plot in Lackawanna, New York, in 2002; another six outside Portland, Oregon, that same year; and the seven who sought to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey in 2007 most prominent among them. The 2007 NYPD report focused on attacks that had taken place in Europe, where homegrown terrorists committed mass atrocities on the Madrid and London commuter systems and murdered Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh.
While they come from diverse ethnic and regional backgrounds, most of the men involved in homegrown plots fit a similar profile: they are middle class and well-educated. The same can be said of many, if not most, Islamist terrorists, whether it be the son of the former Nigerian finance minister who attempted to bring down a plane on Christmas Day near Detroit; the seven British doctors (and one medical technician) who plotted to carry out car bombings in 2007; or Osama bin Laden himself, whose family operates a massive construction empire worth billions of dollars. This reality contradicts the trendy, post-9/11 contention, as wrong then as it is now, that terrorism is caused by poverty.
In this sense, America’s homegrown terrorists resemble Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian-born cleric widely credited as the leading intellectual founder of contemporary political Islam and a prominent figure in the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb, who gained prominence in the 1950s and was executed by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime in 1966, was radicalized not by his childhood experiences or encounters with American imperialism but rather by a two-year visit to the United States that commenced in 1948. It was there that he developed a hatred for what he considered to be the unparalleled materialism and licentiousness of American culture; he was particularly scandalized by a church dance in Greeley, Colorado. “Jazz,” Qutb wrote of the prototypical American, “is his preferred music, and it is created by Negroes to satisfy their love of noise and to whet their sexual desires.”
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To be sure, and it bears repeating, the murderous actions of Nidal Hasan and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (the murderer of the military recruiter in Little Rock) were not embraced by any appreciable number of American Muslims, and there is no reason to believe the terrorists’ actions enjoy even tacit support in that community. American Muslims have proved crucial to both domestic and international counterterrorism efforts and will continue to play a vital role in identifying extremist influences and thwarting future attacks. But if there is one lesson to be learned from the past year’s events, it is that the only prerequisite for a successful terrorist act—whether it be the shooting of a single military recruiter or the destruction of a major landmark—is a lone determined person able to elude law enforcement and the increasingly alert eyes of the general public.
Despite all the available evidence pointing to the destruction that homegrown terrorists can wreak on free societies, some seem to have drawn the completely opposite conclusion about their proliferation and potential. They have interpreted Hasan’s “loner” credentials as, in the words of Ezra Klein, a blogger for the Washington Post, “encouraging,” for it indicates that his killing spree was not connected to a larger series of plots designed and carried out by an extensive, international network, all orchestrated from remote, hard-to-target locations in foreign countries.
Given the obvious difficulties of carrying on military operations overseas—which, had Hasan been aided and abetted by a foreign government or terrorist group headquartered in another country, would have been the most likely American response to his attack—perhaps this is in some sense reassuring. Yet while there may be a level of cursory relief to be gained from this analysis, the implications of what Nidal Hasan managed to pull off, without the assistance of a state or subnational terrorist group, may be even more disturbing than if he had been a foreign agent. The only evidence unearthed of his connection to foreign sources is a series of e-mails he exchanged years ago with Anwar al-Aulaqi, a Salafist imam whose work Nidal Hasan found on the Internet. The imam himself was a visitor at the very mosque in northern Virginia frequented by the five Washingtonians who were in Pakistan late last year.
What the events of November 5, 2009, demonstrate is that it takes only a single, freelance extremist willing to give his life in the service of a murderous cause to carry out a terrorist attack on American soil. The perpetrator need never even establish formal contacts with al-Qaeda or any of its affiliated organizations. All he requires is a militant ideology and the necessary implements to carry out the murder of innocents, tools readily available in the United States to anyone disposed to commit such a crime. That person has nearly unlimited freedom of movement and action.
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How to combat the homegrown terrorism threat? The first step is to recognize the problem. And it is this condition that may prove most difficult. “It would be a shame—as great a tragedy as this was—it would be a shame if our diversity became a casualty as well,” General George Casey, the Army chief of staff, said in response to the Fort Hood massacre. While it is no doubt important to welcome Muslims into the American military (given that we are fighting wars in two Muslim countries), this sort of remark indicates the atmosphere of political correctness that hangs over this issue like a dense fog. Despite the evidence that poured in over the days and weeks after the Fort hood attack, a variety of pundits and government officials refused to acknowledge that what motivated Hasan to kill was extremist Islam, explaining away the killings as the actions of a deranged recluse, no different from those of an unhinged postal worker.
Such remonstrations seem to follow every warning about homegrown terrorism. When the NYPD released its 2007 report, the Council on American Islamic Relations, one of the country’s most prominent and outspoken Muslim groups, stated that “its sweeping generalizations and mixing of unrelated elements may serve to cast a pall of suspicion over the entire American Muslim community.”
The logic of this analysis—that America now faces a homegrown terrorism threat and that Homeland Security may have to increase its surveillance of American Muslims—has proved to be too onerous for many to bear. Predictably, some on the Left have argued that the best way to avert future terrorist attacks, whether foreign or domestic in origin, is to strike at the root of the problem: American foreign policy. Radically altering America’s role in the world has long been a signature cause of the Left, and the admonition that failure to do so may result in the deaths of innocent Americans ostensibly gives the argument more salience. This case was made most plainly by New America Foundation fellow Robert Wright in the New York Times. In a piece entitled “Who Created Major Hasan,” Wright essentially answered the question as a formulation of cartoonist Walt Kelly’s conservationist mantra, “We have met the enemy, and he is us.” While conceding that Hasan is “crazy,” Wright wrote that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the opposition to those interventions by Muslims around the world, led him to see why “the hawkish war-on-terrorism strategy—a global anti-jihad that creates nonstop imagery of Americans killing Muslims—is so dubious.”*
Of course, terrorism against the United States began long before American boots ever landed in Afghanistan or Iraq; surely Wright is familiar with the chronology of 9/11 in relation to those two wars. Moreover, if Hasan and his ideological confreres were legitimately concerned with the fate of the Muslim umma, they would direct their anger toward the likes of al--Qaeda and the regime in Tehran, which are daily responsible for the deliberate and wanton slaughter of Muslim civilians. It is true, and terrorism analysts working with the NYPD and other government agencies readily admit, that the endless images of bloodshed in Afghanistan and Iraq provide Islamists with easy visual recruiting tools and that their task has become easier thanks to the Internet. But surely the worst thing the United States could do—after surveying the mayhem successfully, and potentially, executed by domestic Muslim extremists—is to decide that the way to solve this problem is to bow to their demands.
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One would think that the increase in successful and near successful domestic-terrorism plots over the past year would engender some sort of recognition on the part of people who think and write about current events that a very real threat exists. And, to be sure, reading the mainstream press and listening to elite pundits over the past year, it is clear that the peril of domestic terrorism does occupy their thoughts. But it is decidedly not Islamist terrorism that they consider to be the great danger facing the country but rather violent extremism of an altogether different sort: “right-wing” extremism.
The notion that the country is seriously threatened by right-wing terrorism picked up force almost immediately after President Barack Obama was sworn into office and opposition to his domestic and foreign-policy agenda crystallized. Not a day has gone by without manifestations of this disagreement, no matter how innocuous, being deemed “racist” or a danger to the general peace of the Republic. Initially a pastime of the administration’s defenders in the media, criticism of administration policy soon became a governmental concern. In April, it was revealed that the Department of Homeland Security had produced a report entitled “Right-Wing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment,” which acknowledged the radicalizing effect that the election of the nation’s first black president might have on far-Right domestic organizations.
The color of the president’s skin is no small thing, not only for what it says about the amazing progress this country has made in light of its tortured racial history but also in respect to the resentment and anger it has stirred in a very small segment of the American populace. What was irritating about the DHS report, however, was its attempt to conflate legitimate critics of the Obama administration’s domestic agenda, about which reasonable people can disagree, with those who would resort to violence out of their maniacal belief that a supposedly Kenyan-born Manchurian Candidate is leading the country to perdition. But despite mounting evidence over the past year that a domestic Islamist threat was growing, the Left could not draw its attention away from the specter of “right-wing” violence.
In September, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman went so far as to draw a direct parallel between the “poisonous political environment that was interpreted by one right-wing Jewish nationalist as a license to kill [Yitzak] Rabin” in 1995 and today’s America. In September, liberals rushed to condemn, in the words of one of their more prominent writers, “Southern populist terrorism whipped up by the GOP and its Fox and talk radio cohorts,” after a federal census worker was found hanging from a tree in Kentucky with the word “FED” carved into his chest.
“The Next Generation of Lynching?” one popular left-wing blog asked, noting that “the levels of right-wing vitriol have reached psychotic new heights.” When it was later revealed that the man had killed himself, most likely in an attempt to have his family collecton a life-insurance policy, most of these bloggers were silent. The hysteria reached its height in September when, in a live Capitol Hill press conference, the Democratic Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, tearfully invoked the 1978 murder of San Francisco City Supervisor Harvey Milk as an example of where conservative commentary about Obama and the Democratic Congress would inevitably lead.
Had these newfound watchdogs of political comity shown anything near such concern while the last occupant of the White House was in office, their complaints today might be more credible. But they seem to unearth this conscience only when conservatives are out of power. Never mind the series of known (in addition to the many, presumably unreported) assassination attempts against the previous president, so reviled by the same politicians and pundits who now decry the loss of political decorum, or that his murder had actually been delightedly fictionalized in both novelistic (Checkpoint, by Nicholson Baker) and cinematic (Death of a President) form. President Obama, the mandarins of the media assure us, has been the recipient of a hatred the venom of which has not been seen since the assassination of John F. Kennedy (whom, it is always worth pointing out, was murdered by a Communist). The not-so-subtle purpose of this campaign has been to associate the deplorable rhetoric of a handful in the right-wing fever swamp with the appreciable mass of conservatives, thus painting the president’s critics as racists prone to violence.
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Ultimately, there is little more that the United States can do to prevent homegrown terrorism, other than maintain the counter-terrorism policies enacted by the Bush administration in the aftermath of 9/11, policies that proved so successful in preventing another terrorist attack on American soil. Given the rhetoric and actions of the present administration, which wants to shut down the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, prosecute CIA officers for using interrogation techniques disfavored by the American Civil Liberties Union, and generally approach the war on Islamic supremacism as a legalistic exercise, it is hardly certain that such a course will be followed. But the least we can ask of our nation’s political and intellectual elite is that they stop wailing about the phantom menace of “right-wing” terrorism and start paying more attention to the genuine article.
James Kirchick is an assistant editor of the New Republic and online columnist for the New York Daily News.
Sunday, January 10, 2010
The Carter Syndrome
Barack Obama might yet revolutionize America's foreign policy. But if he can't reconcile his inner Thomas Jefferson with his inner Woodrow Wilson, the 44th president could end up like No. 39.
BY WALTER RUSSELL MEAD | JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010
Neither a cold-blooded realist nor a bleeding-heart idealist, Barack Obama has a split personality when it comes to foreign policy. So do most U.S. presidents, of course, and the ideas that inspire this one have a long history at the core of the American political tradition. In the past, such ideas have served the country well. But the conflicting impulses influencing how this young leader thinks about the world threaten to tear his presidency apart -- and, in the worst scenario, turn him into a new Jimmy Carter.
Obama's long deliberation over the war in Afghanistan is a case study in presidential schizophrenia: After 94 days of internal discussion and debate, he ended up splitting the difference -- rushing in more troops as his generals wanted, while calling for their departure to begin in July 2011 as his liberal base demanded. It was a sober compromise that suggests a man struggling to reconcile his worldview with the weight of inherited problems. Like many of his predecessors, Obama is not only buffeted by strong political headwinds, but also pulled in opposing directions by two of the major schools of thought that have guided American foreign-policy debates since colonial times.
In general, U.S. presidents see the world through the eyes of four giants: Alexander Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson. Hamiltonians share the first Treasury secretary's belief that a strong national government and a strong military should pursue a realist global policy and that the government can and should promote economic development and the interests of American business at home and abroad. Wilsonians agree with Hamiltonians on the need for a global foreign policy, but see the promotion of democracy and human rights as the core elements of American grand strategy. Jeffersonians dissent from this globalist consensus; they want the United States to minimize its commitments and, as much as possible, dismantle the national-security state. Jacksonians are today's Fox News watchers. They are populists suspicious of Hamiltonian business links, Wilsonian do-gooding, and Jeffersonian weakness.
Moderate Republicans tend to be Hamiltonians. Move right toward the Sarah Palin range of the party and the Jacksonian influence grows. Centrist Democrats tend to be interventionist-minded Wilsonians, while on the left and the dovish side they are increasingly Jeffersonian, more interested in improving American democracy at home than exporting it abroad.
Some presidents build coalitions; others stay close to one favorite school. As the Cold War ended, George H.W. Bush's administration steered a largely Hamiltonian course, and many of those Hamiltonians later dissented from his son's war in Iraq. Bill Clinton's administration in the 1990s mixed Hamiltonian and Wilsonian tendencies. This dichotomy resulted in bitter administration infighting when those ideologies came into conflict -- over humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and Rwanda, for example, and again over the relative weight to be given to human rights and trade in U.S. relations with China.
More recently, George W. Bush's presidency was defined by an effort to bring Jacksonians and Wilsonians into a coalition; the political failure of Bush's ambitious approach created the context that made the Obama presidency possible.
Sept. 11, 2001, was one of those rare and electrifying moments that waken Jacksonian America and focus its attention on the international arena. The U.S. homeland was not only under attack, it was under attack by an international conspiracy of terrorists who engaged in what Jacksonians consider dishonorable warfare: targeting civilians. Jacksonian attitudes toward war were shaped by generations of conflict with Native American peoples across the United States and before that by centuries of border conflict in England, Scotland, and Ireland. Against "honorable" enemies who observe the laws of war, one is obliged to fight fair; those who disregard the rules must be hunted down and killed, regardless of technical niceties.
When the United States is attacked, Jacksonians demand action; they leave strategy to the national leadership. But Bush's tough-minded Jacksonian response to 9/11 -- invading Afghanistan and toppling the Taliban government that gave safe haven to the plotters -- gave way to what appeared to be Wilsonian meddling in Iraq. Originally, Bush's argument for overthrowing Saddam Hussein rested on two charges that resonated powerfully with Jacksonians: Hussein was building weapons of mass destruction, and he had close links with al Qaeda. But the war dragged on, and as Hussein's fabled hoards of WMD failed to appear and the links between Iraq and al Qaeda failed to emerge, Bush shifted to a Wilsonian rationale. This was no longer a war of defense against a pending threat or a war of retaliation; it was a war to establish democracy, first in Iraq and then throughout the region. Nation-building and democracy-spreading became the cornerstones of the administration's Middle East policy.
Bush could not have developed a strategy better calculated to dissolve his political support at home. Jacksonians historically have little sympathy for expensive and risky democracy-promoting ventures abroad. They generally opposed the humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti during the Clinton years; they did not and do not think American young people should die and American treasure should be scattered to spread democracy or protect human rights overseas. Paradoxically, Jacksonians also opposed "cut and run" options to end the war in Iraq even as they lost faith in both Bush and the Republican Party; they don't like wars for democracy, but they also don't want to see the United States lose once troops and the national honor have been committed. In Bush's last year in office, a standoff ensued: The Democratic congressional majorities were powerless to force change in his Iraq strategy and Bush remained free to increase U.S. troop levels, yet the war itself and Bush's rationale for it remained deeply unpopular.
Enter Obama. An early and consistent opponent of the Iraq war, Obama was able to bring together the elements of the Democratic Party's foreign-policy base who were most profoundly opposed to (and horrified by) Bush's policy. Obama made opposition to the Iraq war a centerpiece of his eloquent campaign, drawing on arguments that echoed U.S. anti-war movements all the way back to Henry David Thoreau's opposition to the Mexican-American War.
Like Carter in the 1970s, Obama comes from the old-fashioned Jeffersonian wing of the Democratic Party, and the strategic goal of his foreign policy is to reduce America's costs and risks overseas by limiting U.S. commitments wherever possible. He's a believer in the notion that the United States can best spread democracy and support peace by becoming an example of democracy at home and moderation abroad. More than this, Jeffersonians such as Obama think oversize commitments abroad undermine American democracy at home. Large military budgets divert resources from pressing domestic needs; close association with corrupt and tyrannical foreign regimes involves the United States in dirty and cynical alliances; the swelling national-security state threatens civil liberties and leads to powerful pro-war, pro-engagement lobbies among corporations nourished on grossly swollen federal defense budgets.
While Bush argued that the only possible response to the 9/11 attacks was to deepen America's military and political commitments in the Middle East, Obama initially sought to enhance America's security by reducing those commitments and toning down aspects of U.S. Middle East policy, such as support for Israel, that foment hostility and suspicion in the region. He seeks to pull U.S. power back from the borderlands of Russia, reducing the risk of conflict with Moscow. In Latin America, he has so far behaved with scrupulous caution and, clearly, is hoping to normalize relations with Cuba while avoiding collisions with the "Bolivarian" states of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia.
Obama seeks a quiet world in order to focus his efforts on domestic reform -- and to create conditions that would allow him to dismantle some of the national-security state inherited from the Cold War and given new life and vigor after 9/11. Preferring disarmament agreements to military buildups and hoping to substitute regional balance-of-power arrangements for massive unilateral U.S. force commitments all over the globe, the president wishes ultimately for an orderly world in which burdens are shared and the military power of the United States is a less prominent feature on the international scene.
While Wilsonians believe that no lasting stability is possible in a world filled with dictatorships, Jeffersonians like Obama argue that even bad regimes can be orderly international citizens if the incentives are properly aligned. Syria and Iran don't need to become democratic states for the United States to reach long-term, mutually beneficial arrangements with them. And it is North Korea's policies, not the character of its regime, that pose a threat to the Pacific region.
At this strategic level, Obama's foreign policy looks a little bit like that of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. In Afghanistan and Iraq, he hopes to extract U.S. forces from costly wars by the contemporary equivalent of the "Vietnamization" policy of the Nixon years. He looks to achieve an opening with Iran comparable to Nixon's rapprochement with communist China. Just as Nixon established a constructive relationship with China despite the radical "Red Guard" domestic policies Chinese leader Mao Zedong was pursuing at the time, Obama does not see ideological conflict as necessarily leading to poor strategic relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic. Just as Nixon and Kissinger sought to divert international attention from their retreat in Indochina by razzle-dazzle global diplomacy that placed Washington at the center of world politics even as it reduced its force posture, so too the Obama administration hopes to use the president's global popularity to cover a strategic withdrawal from the exposed position in the Middle East that it inherited from the Bush administration.
This is both an ambitious and an attractive vision. Success would reduce the level of international tension even as the United States scales back its commitments. The United States would remain, by far, the dominant military power in the world, but it would sustain this role with significantly fewer demands on its resources and less danger of war.
Yet as Obama is already discovering, any president attempting such a Jeffersonian grand strategy in the 21st century faces many challenges. In the 19th-century heyday of Jeffersonian foreign policy in American politics, it was easier for U.S. presidents to limit the country's commitments. Britain played a global role similar to that of the United States today, providing a stable security environment and promoting international trade and investment. Cruising as a free rider in the British world system allowed Americans to reap the benefits of Britain's world order without paying its costs.
As British power waned in the 20th century, Americans faced starker choices. With the British Empire no longer able to provide political and economic security worldwide, the United States had to choose between replacing Britain as the linchpin of world order with all the headaches that entailed or going about its business in a disorderly world. In the 1920s and 1930s, Americans gave this latter course a try; the rapid-fire series of catastrophes -- the Great Depression, World War II, Stalin's bid for Eurasian hegemony -- convinced virtually all policymakers that the first course, risky and expensive as it proved, was the lesser of the two evils.
Indeed, during Franklin D. Roosevelt's first two terms, the United States pursued essentially Jeffersonian policies in Europe and Asia, avoiding confrontations with Germany and Japan. The result was the bloodiest war in world history, not a stable condominium of satisfied powers. Since that time, Jeffersonians have had to come to terms with the vast set of interlocking political, economic, and military commitments that bind the United States to its role in the postwar era. Jeffersonian instincts call for pruning these commitments back, but it is not always easy to know where to cut.
The other schools are generally skeptical about reducing American commitments. Wilsonians interpret Jeffersonian restraint as moral cowardice. Why, they ask, did Obama refuse to meet the sainted Dalai Lama on his way to kowtow to the dictators in Beijing? Jacksonians think it is cowardice pure and simple. And why not stand up to Iran? Hamiltonians may agree with Jeffersonian restraint in particular cases -- they don't want to occupy Darfur either -- but sooner or later they attack Jeffersonians for failing to develop and project sufficient American power in a dangerous world. Moreover, Hamiltonians generally favor free trade and a strong dollar policy; in current circumstances Hamiltonians are also pushing fiscal restraint. Obama will not willingly move far or fast enough to keep them happy.
The widespread criticism of Obama's extended Afghanistan deliberations is a case in point. To a Jeffersonian president, war is a grave matter and such an undesirable course that it should only be entered into with the greatest deliberation and caution; war is truly a last resort, and the costs of rash commitments are more troubling than the costs of debate and delay. Hamiltonians would be more concerned with executing the decision swiftly and with hiding from other powers any impression of division among American counsels. But Obama found harsh critics on all sides: Wilsonians recoiled from the evident willingness of the president to abandon human rights or political objectives to settle the war. Jacksonians did not understand what, other than cowardice or "dithering," could account for his reluctance to support the professional military recommendation. And the most purist of the Jeffersonians -- neoisolationists on both left and right -- turned on Obama as a sellout. Jeffersonian foreign policy is no bed of roses.
In recent history, Jeffersonian foreign policy has often faced attacks from all the other schools of thought. Kissinger's policy of détente was blasted on the right by conservative Republicans who wanted a stronger stand against communism and on the left by human rights Democrats who hated the cynical regional alliances the Nixon Doctrine involved (with the shah of Iran, for example). Carter faced many of the same problems, and the image of weakness and indecision that helped doom his 1980 run for re-election is a perennial problem for Jeffersonian presidents. Obama will have to leap over these hurdles now, too.
It is not only Americans who will challenge the new American foreign policy. Will Russia and Iran respond to Obama's conciliatory approach with reciprocal concessions -- or, emboldened by what they interpret as American weakness and faltering willpower, will they keep pushing forward? Will the president's outreach to the moderate majority of Muslims around the world open an era of better understanding, or will the violent minority launch new attacks that undercut the president's standing at home? Will the president's inability to deliver all the Israeli concessions Arabs would like erode his credibility and contribute to even deeper levels of cynicism and alienation across the Middle East? Can the president execute an orderly reduction in the U.S. military stake in Iraq and Afghanistan without having hostile forces fill the power vacuum? Will Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez be so impressed with American restraint under Obama that he moderates his own course and ceases to make anti Yanquismo a pillar of his domestic and international policy? Will other countries heed the president's call to assume more international responsibility as the United States reduces its commitments -- or will they fail to fulfill their obligations as stakeholders in the international system?
A Jeffersonian policy of restraint and withdrawal requires cooperation from many other countries, but the prospect of a lower American profile may make others less, rather than more, willing to help the United States.
There is an additional political problem for this president, one that he shares with Carter. In both cases, their basic Jeffersonian approach was balanced in part by a strong attraction to idealistic Wilsonian values and their position at the head of a Democratic Party with a distinct Wilsonian streak. A pure Jeffersonian wants to conserve the shining exceptionalism of the American democratic experience and believes that American values are rooted in U.S. history and culture and are therefore not easily exportable.
For this president, that is too narrow a view. Like Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Martin Luther King Jr., Barack Obama doesn't just love the United States for what it is. He loves what it should -- and can -- be. Leadership is not the art of preserving a largely achieved democratic project; governing is the art of pushing the United States farther down the road toward the still-distant goal of fulfilling its mission and destiny.
Obama may well believe what he said in his inaugural speech -- "we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals" -- but as any president must he is already making exactly those tradeoffs. Why else refuse to meet the Dalai Lama? Why else pledge support to the corrupt regime of President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan or aid Pakistan despite the dismal track record of both the civil and military arms of the Pakistani government when it comes to transparent use of U.S. resources? Did the administration not renew its efforts to build a relationship with the regime in Tehran even as peaceful democratic protesters were being tortured and raped in its jails? Is Obama not taking "incentives" to Khartoum, a regime that has for more than a decade pursued a policy in Darfur that the U.S. government has labeled genocidal?
It is hard to reconcile the transcendent Wilsonian vision of America's future with a foreign policy based on dirty compromises with nasty regimes. If the government should use its power and resources to help the poor and the victims of injustice at home, shouldn't it do something when people overseas face extreme injustice and extreme peril? The Obama administration cannot easily abandon a human rights agenda abroad. The contradiction between the sober and limited realism of the Jeffersonian worldview and the expansive, transformative Wilsonian agenda is likely to haunt this administration as it haunted Carter's, most fatefully when he rejected calls to let the shah of Iran launch a brutal crackdown to remain in power. Already the Wilsonians in Obama's camp are muttering darkly about his failure to swiftly close the Guantánamo prison camp, his fondness for government secrecy, his halfhearted support for investigating abuses of the past administration, and his failure to push harder for a cap-and-trade bill before the Copenhagen summit.
Over time, these rumblings of discontent will grow, and history will continue to throw curveballs at him. Can this president live with himself if he fails to prevent a new round of genocide in the Great Lakes region of Africa? Can he wage humanitarian war if all else fails? Can he make these tough decisions quickly and confidently when his closest advisors and his political base are deeply and hopelessly at odds?
The Jeffersonian concern with managing America's foreign policy at the lowest possible level of risk has in the past helped presidents develop effective grand strategies, such as George Kennan's early Cold War idea of containment and the early 19th-century Monroe Doctrine. If successful, Obama's restructuring of American foreign policy would be as influential as these classic strategic designs.
Recent decades, however, have seen diminishing Jeffersonian influence in U.S. foreign policy. Americans today perceive problems all over the world; the Jeffersonian response often strikes people as too passive. Kennan's modest form of containment quickly lost ground to Dean Acheson's more muscular and militarized approach of responding to Soviet pressure by building up U.S. and allied forces in Europe and Asia. The Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente was repudiated by both the Republican and Democratic parties. Carter came into the White House hoping to end the Cold War, but by the end of his tenure he was supporting the resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, increasing the defense budget, and laying the groundwork for an expanded U.S. presence in the Middle East.
In the 21st century, American presidents have a new set of questions to consider. The nature of the international system and the place of the United States in it will have to be rethought as new powers rise, old ones continue to fade, and attention shifts from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The rapid technological development that is the hallmark of our era will reshape global society at a pace that challenges the ability of every country in the world to manage cascading, accelerating change.
With great dignity and courage, Obama has embarked on a difficult and uncertain journey. The odds, I fear, are not in his favor, and it is not yet clear that his intuitions and instincts amount to the kind of grand design that statesmen like John Quincy Adams and Henry Kissinger produced in the past. But there can be no doubt that American foreign policy requires major rethinking.
At their best, Jeffersonians provide a necessary element of caution and restraint in U.S. foreign policy, preventing what historian Paul Kennedy calls "imperial overstretch" by ensuring that America's ends are proportionate to its means. We need this vision today more than ever: If Obama's foreign policy collapses -- whether sunk by Afghanistan or conflicts not yet foreseen -- into the incoherence and reversals that ultimately marked Carter's well-meaning but flawed approach, it will be even more difficult for future presidents to chart a prudent and cautious course through the rough seas ahead.
Walter Russell Mead is Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. He blogs at The American Interest