Saturday, June 20, 2009

Market-based solutions can reduce the national health-care bill by 40%.

Effective health-care reform must meet two objectives: 1) It must secure coverage for all Americans, and 2) it must dramatically lower the cost of health care. Health-care spending has outpaced the rise in all other consumer spending by nearly a factor of three since 1980, increasing to 18% of GDP in 2009 from 9% of GDP. This disturbing trend will not change regardless of who pays these costs -- government or the private sector -- unless we can find a way to improve the health of our citizens. Failure to do so will make American companies less competitive in the global marketplace, increase taxes, and undermine our economy.

At Safeway we believe that well-designed health-care reform, utilizing market-based solutions, can ultimately reduce our nation's health-care bill by 40%. The key to achieving these savings is health-care plans that reward healthy behavior. As a self-insured employer, Safeway designed just such a plan in 2005 and has made continuous improvements each year. The results have been remarkable. During this four-year period, we have kept our per capita health-care costs flat (that includes both the employee and the employer portion), while most American companies' costs have increased 38% over the same four years.

[Steven A. Burd] Martin Kozlowski

Safeway's plan capitalizes on two key insights gained in 2005. The first is that 70% of all health-care costs are the direct result of behavior. The second insight, which is well understood by the providers of health care, is that 74% of all costs are confined to four chronic conditions (cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes and obesity). Furthermore, 80% of cardiovascular disease and diabetes is preventable, 60% of cancers are preventable, and more than 90% of obesity is preventable.

As much as we would like to take credit for being a health-care innovator, Safeway has done nothing more than borrow from the well-tested automobile insurance model. For decades, driving behavior has been correlated with accident risk and has therefore translated into premium differences among drivers. Stated somewhat differently, the auto-insurance industry has long recognized the role of personal responsibility. As a result, bad behaviors (like speeding, tickets for failure to follow the rules of the road, and frequency of accidents) are considered when establishing insurance premiums. Bad driver premiums are not subsidized by the good driver premiums.

As with most employers, Safeway's employees pay a portion of their own health care through premiums, co-pays and deductibles. The big difference between Safeway and most employers is that we have pronounced differences in premiums that reflect each covered member's behaviors. Our plan utilizes a provision in the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act that permits employers to differentiate premiums based on behaviors. Currently we are focused on tobacco usage, healthy weight, blood pressure and cholesterol levels.

Safeway's Healthy Measures program is completely voluntary and currently covers 74% of the insured nonunion work force. Employees are tested for the four measures cited above and receive premium discounts off a "base level" premium for each test they pass. Data is collected by outside parties and not shared with company management. If they pass all four tests, annual premiums are reduced $780 for individuals and $1,560 for families. Should they fail any or all tests, they can be tested again in 12 months. If they pass or have made appropriate progress on something like obesity, the company provides a refund equal to the premium differences established at the beginning of the plan year.

At Safeway, we are building a culture of health and fitness. The numbers speak for themselves. Our obesity and smoking rates are roughly 70% of the national average and our health-care costs for four years have been held constant. When surveyed, 78% of our employees rated our plan good, very good or excellent. In addition, 76% asked for more financial incentives to reward healthy behaviors. We have heard from dozens of employees who lost weight, lowered their blood-pressure and cholesterol levels, and are enjoying better health because of this program. Many discovered for the first time that they have high blood pressure, and others have been told by their doctor that they have added years to their life.

Today, we are constrained by current laws from increasing these incentives. We reward plan members $312 per year for not using tobacco, yet the annual cost of insuring a tobacco user is $1,400. Reform legislation needs to raise the federal legal limits so that incentives can better match the true incremental benefit of not engaging in these unhealthy behaviors. If these limits are appropriately increased, I am confident Safeway's per capita health-care costs will decline for at least another five years as our work force becomes healthier.

The Healthy Measures program currently applies only to our nonunion work force. While we have numerous health and wellness provisions in our union contracts, we are working with union leaders like Joe Hansen of the United Food and Commercial Workers to incorporate healthy measures provisions in our union work force as well.

While comprehensive health-care reform needs to address a number of other key issues, we believe that personal responsibility and financial incentives are the path to a healthier America. By our calculation, if the nation had adopted our approach in 2005, the nation's direct health-care bill would be $550 billion less than it is today. This is almost four times the $150 billion that most experts estimate to be the cost of covering today's 47 million uninsured. The implication is that we can achieve health-care reform with universal coverage and declining per capita health-care costs.

There is a very real possibility that we will see positive transformational health-care reform in the near future. I am encouraged by the effort I see on Capitol Hill, particularly the bipartisan effort in the Senate. While some tough issues remain, if we continue to work in a bipartisan manner I believe we will resolve these issues successfully and find agreement on meaningful reform.

Mr. Burd is CEO of Safeway Inc., and the founder of the Coalition to Advance Healthcare Reform.

Obama’s New Liberal Realism

President Obama has largely drawn praise for his tepid response to the mass uprisings in Iran challenging the reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In general, Obama has offered three justifications for his tentativeness — and they have strangely been accepted by his supporters, who almost immediately evolved in lockstep from liberal Wilsonians to hardcore realists.

Here are Obama’s three justifications:

1. Given the historical record of U.S. intervention in Iran, we do not wish either to perpetuate that shameful record, or to hang on the necks of the dissidents the smelly albatross of U.S. support.

2. We don’t know which side will emerge triumphant. Supporting losers in the street will only antagonize the Ahmadinejad regime and render Obama’s ongoing diplomatic overtures null and void.

3. There is not much difference anyway between the agendas of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and those of his challengers, led by Mir-Hossein Mousavi Khameneh. No matter who wins, Iran will still have an overtly anti-American government bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. Why then incur further hostility for a response that would bring no advantage anyway?

There are a number of things wrong with all this — well aside from the strange spectacle of seeing once-fervent liberal critics of old-style Kissingerian realism suddenly espousing Barack Obama’s kinder, gentler version of it.

1. The coup that unseated Mohammad Mossadeq was in 1953 — nearly six decades ago. Its details are still controversial: the proportional degree of CIA intervention compared to that of the British, the role of fundamentalist clerics in the opposition, the degree to which Mossadeq himself entertained authoritarian measures, and so on. What Kermit Roosevelt Jr. did or did not do as the CIA officer in charge, what were the actual intentions of the Mossadeq government in the Soviet-American Cold War rivalry — all of that is all now in the distant past.

Blaming America for undermining Mossadeq but not blaming it for later undermining the Shah is about as logical as claiming we must hold the current generations of Japanese accountable for Pearl Harbor, or that German actions in World War II permanently warped the American psyche, or that the Chinese Communists’ butchering thousands of Americans in Korea must be held against current generations of Chinese. At some point, all nations, big and small, need to get a life and move on. Of course, when one rushes in and blabbers out apologies without context, then one becomes a prisoner of those past actions — we are to be sorry about Iran then and so must be sorry ever after.

Iran, remember, has no such reluctance about meddling. It endorsed Bush in the 2004 presidential race — to the delight of the Kerry campaign. For six years, it has tried to murder Americans in Iraq and destabilize the Iraqi democracy. It has killed Americans in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, and done its best to thwart democratic government in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iraq. How odd that Iranian theocrats have no worries about violently overthrowing democracy abroad, while we are terrified of supporting democracy by words alone.

Criticizing the Ahmadinejad government for its election fraud and its response to peaceful demonstrations is not synonymous with crudely egging on street demonstrations. Reagan found a way to voice support for the Polish resistance to Soviet thuggery. Kennedy made sure that the Berliners knew that we believed they were right and the Soviet-sponsored East German Communists wrong.

In contrast, Ford’s calculated snub of Solzhenitsyn brought no gratitude from the Soviets, but plenty of shame to America. The elder Bush’s allegiance to Gorbachev over Yeltsin was finally embarrassing, and was rendered obsolete almost before it was embraced. To the extent that George W. Bush spoke out against autocracy in the Gulf and Egypt, he was to be praised, and some liberalization followed; but to the extent that he grew quiet in his second term, we were branded as hypocrites for supporting freedom in Iraq but not elsewhere in the Arab world.

Support for the reformers can be framed in terms of shared criticism of what we and they oppose, rather than clumsy cheering for their own agenda.

2. Voicing careful and wise support for the challenge to Ahmadinejad’s thuggery can influence events. That’s why the European Union is well ahead of us in its condemnation of the Iranian election fraud and subsequent crackdown.

Ahmadinejad is going to blame the U.S. whatever it does. He rightly sized up the new administration and realized there is now an American government that will apologize for the CIA’s actions in 1953, but not ask Iran to apologize for its deplorable record in Iraq from 2003 to 2009. So it is a one-way street with Iran, and it’s better to be damned for voicing criticism than for being afraid to voice criticism.

The Iranian theocrats are realists par excellence; they do not give a damn about ideals or morality, and will deal with us in the future on their perception of their own self-interest: whether or not we “meddle” now, if they find it useful to talk in the future, they will; if they find it of no value to talk in the future, they won’t.

3. Obama’s third assumption makes even less sense than the first two. Mousavi may be a past supporter of Khomeinism, as are ostensibly all Iranian politicians. But he is not on a moral or even a practical par with Ahmadinejad. He has already voiced criticism of Holocaust denial, and has called for freer expression and communication, and for liberalization of Iranian theocratic law. In other words, he is a type of multicultural “other” who is a rational opponent of U.S. policy, but whom Obama actually could court.

Furthermore, the crowds seem already to have transcended Mousavi, seeing in him more a tool than a totem, hoping that his election would lead to far more liberalization than even he intended. One of the reasons Gorbachev was welcomed by Reagan was that he began to initiate change that would soon render Gorbachev himself obsolete. The same may well be true with Mousavi.

In conclusion, we are seeing a new multicultural realism in American foreign policy — the result of a number of currents in our popular culture. We do not judge the authoritarian “other” in the same way in which we judge authoritarian conservatives abroad who ape Westernism.

There is also a weird sort of multicultural fantasy about cleric-ruled Iran, fueled by the non-Western dress of its elites, the constant evocation of 1953 (ironically by fundamentalists whose forefathers approved of Mossadeq’s removal), and its serial Hollywood-like denunciation of America. Ahmadinejad brilliantly ties into the Che effect, which makes his blood-curdling remarks about Israel’s end about as disturbing to American public opinion as the fact that Che himself was a cold-blooded killer who executed the innocent with his own hands. Add it all up and we get a reprise of Bill Clinton at Davos in 2005 gushing on about Iranian democracy and its progressives, as if a rigged plebiscite overseen by a group of unshaven dictators in Nehru-like coats is somehow neat.

Iraq explains a lot — and provides the greatest irony of all. We wish not to meddle in Iran in order to encourage real democracy there, but we accept Iranian meddling intended to destroy Iraqi democracy. We reach out to the Shiite thug Ahmadinejad in Iran, but not to the Shiite moderate Maliki in Iraq. We feel so guilty about promoting Iraqi democracy that we won’t aid its budding counterpart in nearby Iran. We are so wedded to the canard that the removal of Saddam removed the counterweight to Iran and empowered the clerics that we cannot see the existence of Iraqi democracy as a great catalyst to the democratic forces in Iran, undermining the theocracy more with words than Iran could undermine the Iraqi democracy with guns.

Then, of course, there is Obama and his quest for a global messianic rather than an American presidential role. So far it pays to be Hamas and the Palestine Authority rather than Israel, Chávez rather than Uribe, Ahmadinejad rather than Maliki, Putin rather than an Eastern European elected prime minister, a Turkish Islamist rather than a Greek elected prime minister. The former all gain attention by their hostility, the latter earn neglect by their moderation and generally pro-American views. Praising Islam abroad is a lot more catchy than praising democracy — one boldly inspires Bush’s critics, the other sheepishly dovetails with Bush’s agenda. All that, in varying degrees, also explains the troubling neglect of the Iranians in the street.

One mystery remains: Does Obama do this because the squeaky problem gets the attention, or does he really empathize with the tired anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist refrain of those who used to be considered hostile?

Our Historically Challenged President

Understanding the Age of Obama

Are you confused by all that has changed since President Barack Obama took office in January? If so, you're not alone. Perhaps, though, this handy guide to Age of Obama "logic" might be of some assistance.

1. The Budget. Wanting to cut $17 billion from the budget, as President Obama has promised, is proof of financial responsibility. Borrowing $1.84 trillion this year for new programs is "stimulus." The old phrase "out-of-control spending" is inoperative.

2. Unemployment. The number of jobs theoretically saved, or created, by new government policies - not the actual percentage of Americans out of work, or the total number of jobs lost - is now the far better indicator of unemployment.

3. The Private Sector. Nationalizing much of the auto and financial industries, while regulating executive compensation, is an indication of our new government's repeatedly stated reluctance to interfere in the private sector.

4. Race and Gender. Not what is said but who says it and about whom reveals racism and sexism. For example, an Hispanic female judge isn't being offensive if she states that Latinas are inherently better judges than white males.

5. Random violence. Some assassinations represent larger American pathologies, but others do not. When a crazed lone gunman murders someone outside the Holocaust Museum or shoots an abortion doctor, we should worry about growing right-wing and Christian extremism. But when an African-American Muslim convert brags about his murder of a military recruitment officer or an Islamic group plots to kill Jews and blow up a military jet, these are largely isolated incidents without larger relevance.

6. Terrorism. Acts of terror disappeared about six months ago. Thankfully, we live now in an age where there will be - in the new vocabulary of the Obama administration - only occasional "overseas contingency operations" in which we may be forced to hold a few "detainees." At the same time, ongoing military tribunals, renditions, wiretaps, phone intercepts and predator-drone assassinations are no longer threats to the Constitution. And just saying you're going to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay is proof that it is almost closed.

7. Iraq. The once-despised Iraq war thankfully ended around Jan. 20, 2009, and has now transformed into a noble experiment that is fanning winds of change throughout the Middle East. There will be no need for any more Hollywood cinema exposés of American wartime crimes in Iraq with titles like "Rendition," "Redacted," "Lions for Lambs" and "Stop-Loss."

8. The West. Western values and history aren't apparently that special or unique. As President Obama told the world during his recent speech in Cairo, the Renaissance and Enlightenment were, in fact, fueled by a brilliant Islamic culture, responsible for landmark discoveries in mathematics, science and medicine. Slavery in America ended without violence. Mistreatment of women and religious intolerance in the Middle East have comparable parallels in America.

9. Media. The media are disinterested and professional observers of the present administration. When television anchormen and senior magazine editors bow to the president, proclaim him a god or feel tingling in the legs when he speaks, it is quite normal.

10. George W. Bush. Former President Bush did all sorts of bad things to the United States that only now we are learning will take at least eight years to sort out. "Bush did it" for the next decade will continue to explain the growing unemployment rate, the most recent deficit, the new round of tensions with Iran and North Korea, and the growing global unrest from the Middle East to South America.

Once we remember and accept the logic of the above, then almost everything about this Age of Obama begins to make perfect sense.

Victor Davis Hanson is a classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and author, most recently, of "A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War." You can reach him by e-mailing author@victorhanson.com.

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Inc: Who are the five most influential entrepreneurs of the past 30 years?

Bono

Bono

Bono is illustrative of the broadening role in society for entrepreneurs. Through his organization, ONE, he has helped to persuade governments to forgive $100 billion worth of debt. Like Bill Gates and Steve Jobs, he has used his expertise, his fame, and his contacts to make some truly impressive gains.

Bono - a case for the defence

The latest issue of The Word magazine has a picture of Bono on the cover, with the headline ‘Superstar saviour or sanctimonious git? Bono On Trial: A WORD investigation.’

wordcover771Of course, it is no such thing. An investigation would suggest a genuine issue and a serious journalistic attempt to get to the bottom of it. It is just an attention grabbing headline yolking together some skimpy reminiscences of encounters with the rock star by Word magazine regulars, some axe grinding by familiar Bono bashers and a bit of ranting diatribe by a couple of obscure freelancers who presumably glad of the soap box. With well rehearsed anecdotes U2 watchers will have heard many times before, we learn, well, that Bono is short (its amazing the number of journalists who mention this, as if size explains everything, from Napoleon and Hitler’s desire to conquer Europe to Prince’s musical drive and Tom Cruise’s box office clout. It’s the pygmy theory of megalomania, of which anyone less than 5′ 8″ is automatically suspected), that he is extremely charming, driven and ambitious and that some people don’t like him. Eammon Forde (who he?) doesn’t like him because Bono ruined his teenage years, apparently, by being in a successful Irish band in the 80s when Eammon would have rather there had been a different successful Irish band . Hmm. I think we all have a band like that in our teenage subconscious, Eammon. “Get over it,” is the usual adult response. Hazel Davis (who she?) says he can’t really sing, but then uses nothing to support this apart from insults (she doesn’t tell us which rock singers she thinks can “sing”, or why “singing” matters, and where, say, Bob Dylan, Leonard Cohen, Lou Reed, Tom Waits, Nick Cave, Pete Doherty fit in her particular scale of measuring vocal accomplishment. I have a soul loving amigo who pretty much thinks no rock vocalists can sing, but at least he puts up a structured argument). Dave Marsh (now, I have come across him, because the complete failure of celebrity politics is one of his hobby horses, which he can argue cogently and passionately, although he doesn’t really get into it here, instead trading in insults and trotting out one hugely controversial survival-of-the-fittest African economist, Dambisa Moyo, to support his vague assertion that “Africans” complain Bono speaks for them without so much as asking their permission). Laura Barton concludes this 9 page feature with a kind of vague concern that Bono’s politicking may be driven more by narcissism than philanthropy. She’s not sure, mind you. It’s just a bit of a nagging notion. Now, I really like Laura’s writing about music because she approaches her subjects in an original, poetic, emotional, almost touchy-feely fashion, but as a witness for the prosecution she’s about as damning as Mr Magoo at an identity parade. And that’s about it. If only all trials were conducted in such a random, anecdotal and highly opinionated fashion, with so little recourse to the facts, and no opportunity to answer back.

Now I like Word magazine, and I like the people who make it, but they should be embarrassed about this. It reeks of something cobbled together at the last minute because they didn’t have a suitably heavyweight cover star. The fact that they thought it was a good idea is indicative of the place Bono now occupies in popular culture.

At the height of Live8’s ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign, some wags made a bit of money on the side with a ‘Make Bono History’ t-shirt. For some, Bono is the greatest rock star of our times, to be celebrated as much for his idealism as his music. For others he is an insufferable bore, preaching about how we should live our lives. Perhaps more than any other rock star, he has become a divisive, love him or hate him figure. It is something of which he is well aware. “I’m sick of Bono,” is his standard line. “And I am him.”

It is no secret where I stand on this. I ghosted U2’s autobiography. I have known Bono a long time, and followed his band since my schooldays but every time I mention his name the anti-Bono brigade start sniping at me. I can be accused (and regularly am) of bias and even sycophancy yet I consider myself lucky to have had a front row seat at the gestation of one of the defining rock bands of our times, and I am sure I would feel the same way if it had been The Beatles, The Rolling Stones, Led Zeppelin, The Smiths, Nirvana or Oasis. In terms of ticket and album sales, U2 are up there with the biggest bands of all time. In terms of cultural impact, their influence is all over modern rock, from the scale and imagination of their live presentation to the sonic tapestry of Edge’s guitars and producer Brian Eno’s synths. Many of the most popular rock bands of the moment (Coldplay, Kings of Leon and The Killers, amongst others) are unabashed in their devotion to U2, yet arguably their real influence is not so much musical as ideological. It is about commitment and passion, the notion that a band can stay together for thirty years or more with a work ethic that pushes them to forge music that is relevant, engaging with the pop charts and the wider world too.

Yet it is for the latter that Bono, in particular, is held in contempt. The roots of Bono’s activism lie in his Christian faith, the sense that he has to give something back in order to justify the privileges of his success. He is accused of asking people to dip into their own pockets when he lives a millionaire lifestyle but, in fact, his principal approach is to lobby for political change rather than call for charity. Behind the spotlights, his personal charitable commitments are significant, and critics might be surprised at the relatively modest scale of his family lifestyle. Indeed, his real engagement with Africa started when Bono and his wife did voluntary work at an Ethiopian orphanage during the 1985 famine, where he witnessed despair and heroism that left an indelible impression upon him. Bono acts because he is compelled to.

I have seen what he puts into this, how it possesses him, what it means to him, and the accusations of dilettantism or narcissism are so far wide of the mark as to be laughable. Is there ego involved? Of course, it would be absurd to pretend otherwise. Ego is part of the job description, it’s a necessary force to get someone on stage in front of a rock band in the first place. But it takes more than ego to put in the office hours that Bono does (at least two days a week, even when his full time job in U2 is in full swing). And the ego is reigned in by a palpable humility, a sense of being in service to others, his strong feeling that this is the price his God (not mine, by the way) asks of him in return for all the good things that have happened in his life. You can ask questions, as Dave Marsh regularly does, of the point of celebrity politicking, but the answers lie not in fatuous opinion about motivation, they lie in the math of investment and policy change. There are plenty of figures publicly available, particularly with regard to third world countries who have had billion dollar debts cancelled and have been able to put that money to work in health and education. If you are interested, you might take a look at Data co-founder Jamie Drummond’s comprehensive answer in 2007 to pernicious questions posed by Financial Times journalist Gideon Rachman, which I have copied here. Bono’s organisations, Data and Red work within an umbrella of established aid groups, and I don’t hear them complaining about his involvement. Bottom line, I always think, is that there are people around today, educated and healthy, who wouldn’t have been alive without his energy and commitment to their cause. He is putting in his own time and energy in an effort to make a difference. What exactly is the problem? That he annoys you?

I often hear people suggest that Bono would make his life easier if he wasn’t so in your face, constantly turning up in photo shoots with politicians and other wealthy movers and shakers, but that is his role as a lobbyist, his particular deal with the devil. He wants to get his organisations, packed with highly regarded economists and aid experts, an audience at the highest table, and the price he pays for that is to be the celebrity in the flashbulb, to submit to the photo op.

To ask Bono to reign himself in would be to go against his nature and dilute his impact. Back in the early days of U2 he created two characters to act out onstage, the Fool and the Boy. Only the latter made it onto record (in the songs for U2’s debut album, Boy) but the fool has often been called into service nonetheless. Bono is an optimistic, over enthusiastic, energetic character not afraid (as many in his profession are) of being too cool to make an idiot of himself (which is one reason the criticism of him is so ineffective, Bono has a thick skin). As the lead singer in a band, he considers it his job to jump around and make a big noise, to bang a drum, draw attention, fly a flag (sometimes literally), rally for the cause. He wants to make a difference and so he uses the best tool at his disposal: his fame, his passion, his talent. It is what makes him such a powerful irritant: he is in your ear (and the ears of world leaders) buzzing away, getting his message across.

The same spirit that drives Bono onstage drives U2 in the studio. And ultimately, politics is secondary, because without the music no one would be paying attention. While many of their contemporaries have either retired or retreated to a comfort zone of nostalgic hits, U2 constantly strive to create new work to rival their best, and in the process have had a run of sustained creativity and popularity that sets the bar for everyone in rock and roll (as to recent reports that their new album has been a flop, it currently stands at over three and a half million sales worldwide, not bad going in a peer 2 peer download era. And the tour hasn’t even started yet). Love them or hate them, Bono and U2 will be history when they no longer make music that engages our attention.

I am not suggesting Word are wrong to ask questions of Bono. But what, really, is the question? How about what kind of rock stars do we want? Idealists driven by passionate belief, who stand up to be counted, who try to make a difference, and who espouse the same ideals in their life as in their music? Colourful characters whose imaginative participation in the hurly burly of the world makes pop culture more interesting? Compassionate human beings who feel beholden to give something back for the immense privileges they receive? Or shallow self-interested showbusiness celebrities who never stick their heads above the political parapets for fear that it will get shot off?

There are plenty of the latter, you can see them on magazine covers every day. There is only one Bono. And I’ve got a question for Word and all the other Bono critics who seem to be so offended by his existence. What does it say about them, that the rock star they would put on trial is the one who is making the most effort to do some good in the world?

NMC

Sunday, June 14, 2009

Bikers take a 'Revolutionary Ramble' around Morris; Event raises money for local rescue squads

photo

Jessica Giorgianni, who works in Parsippany, attaches her name tag to the back of her bicycle before the Revolutionary Ramble Bicycle Tour that started in Madison on Saturday.



More than 500 bicyclists christened the first Revolutionary Ramble on Saturday and traveled varying routes around Morris County to raise money for 13 local emergency rescue squads.

"There were some good hills," Jerry Keselman, 53, of Warren, said after finishing the 62-mile course in four hours. "I'm trying to get some hills in, and there were some hills here I didn't expect."

Keselman, like many riders, was training for another event. In his case, he said he's going to partake in a ride through Death Valley in October to benefit juvenile diabetes.

The Morris Area Freewheelers riding group organized the event, which saw roughly 550 participants, ride director Jim Hunt said.

"We are absolutely thrilled ... with the volunteer support we've had for this ride," Hunt said.

Entry fees ranged from $30 to $40, depending on when people registered. Those who signed up for the 62-mile loop left at 8 a.m. The 40-miler participants departed at 9 a.m., and the 25-milers left at 10 a.m. The last group, which rode 12 miles to Washington's Headquarters in Morristown, left at 10:30 a.m.

Hunt said he wouldn't know how much the ramble raised for emergency rescue squads until the money was tallied.

The Ramble rambled on rain or shine, and Saturday brought both. However, depending on the route the bikers took and the positioning of the clouds, they either got drenched or stayed dry.

"It wasn't raining where I was — I could have used some rain," Keselman said.

New Providence residents Krina Griffin, 43, and Jennifer Zimmerman, 45, took the 40-mile route and got drenched.

Both said rain doesn't just get the riders wet, it saturates the road, pushing debris to the sides of the street where bikers ride, which results in many flat tires.

"You avoid it as much as you can," Zimmerman said. However, they weren't so lucky.

"We each had two," Zimmerman said of flat tires.

Despite that, both women said they loved the event.

"It was a challenging ride, it was a good ride," Griffin said.

"The way it was organized was phenomenal," Zimmerman said, adding routes, paths, and directional signs all were clearly marked.

People from Rhode Island, Texas, Pennsylvania, New York, Missouri, Maryland, Florida and Connecticut took part.

"We got caught in the rain but it was a great ride," Rockaway resident Mike O'Hara, 52, said of the 12-mile course he rode with his 13-year-old son, Brendan O'Hara.

Both said it was their first ride and that the rain wasn't a problem.

"It's just another part of the experience," Brendan O'Hara said.

Matt Manochio: 973-428-6627; mmanochi@gannett.com

Bicycle Dreams

Thursday, June 11, 2009

There Is No 'Paradox of Thrift'

Frightened by tough economic times, formerly spendthrift Americans are beginning to save. But the shift is causing alarm among some economists and commentators. Prudent savers, say these writers, are exemplars of the "paradox of thrift," which holds that the practice of thrift, while seemingly wise and rational for the individual, can be harmful for society.

So it is that a Wall Street Journal headline warned: "Hard-Hit Families Finally Start Saving, Aggravating Nation's Economic Woes." A story in the New York Times said the "re-emergence of thrift as a value" presents a serious problem: "Economists call it the Paradox of Thrift." Another Times piece cautioned: "Putting away money and paying down debt may be good for one family's kitchen-table economics, but the broader economy suffers in the short term when millions of families do it." Nobel Prize- winning economist and syndicated Times columnist Paul Krugman regularly beats this drum. And a recent Newsweek cover, evoking World War II recruitment posters, featured a stern-looking Uncle Sam pointing at the reader with the patriotic appeal: "I Want YOU to Start Spending!"

In the 20th century, the paradox of thrift found its greatest champion in John Maynard Keynes. In his Treatise on Money (1930), Keynes argued that "mere abstinence is not enough by itself to build cities or drain fens." It is enterprise that builds. "If Enterprise is afoot," he explained, "wealth accumulates whatever may be happening to Thrift; and if Enterprise is asleep, wealth decays whatever Thrift may be doing. Thus, Thrift may be the handmaiden of Enterprise. But equally she may not. And, perhaps, even usually she is not."

In 1931, in a radio address to the British people on how to fight back against the oncoming Great Depression, Keynes was more vehement about the futility of saving and the wisdom of spending. Sometimes, he said, saving one's money was "quite right," but at other times, including the present one, saving was "utterly harmful and misguided." He bluntly warned his fellow citizens: "The best guess I can make is whenever you save five shillings, you put a man out of work for a day." He concluded with an Uncle Sam-like appeal to patriotism:

Therefore, O patriotic housewives, sally out tomorrow early into the streets and go to the wonderful sales which are everywhere advertised. You will do yourselves good .  .  . [and you will] have the added joy that you are increasing employment, adding to the wealth of the country because you are setting on foot useful activities, bringing a chance and a hope to Lancashire, Yorkshire, and Belfast.

When writing for policymakers and economists, Keynes and his followers spelled out this idea in more formal terms. They posited that whenever a nation's desire to save exceeds productive investment, the result is a savings glut. The excess savings, because they are not smoothly turned into investments, are effectively quarantined from normal economic life, much as if the savers had hidden their money under the floorboards. This phenomenon in turn can help trigger a downward economic spiral, a sort of negative feedback loop in which reduced consumer spending causes greater unemployment, and greater unemployment reduces spending, and so on. In the end, everyone--including the well-meaning chap who saved his five shillings in the first place--comes out poorer.

Finally, periods of economic downturn, when people's natural concern for the future may cause them to try to save more, are precisely the periods in which savings gluts can do the most damage to society, by deepening rather than counteracting the downward turn in the business cycle.

Ever since Keynes, the proposition that thrift can be paradoxical has been widely accepted. It made its way into the best-known economics textbook of the second half of the 20th century, Economics by Paul A. Samuelson and (in later editions) William Nordhaus. Not only does it continue to influence each generation of policymakers and commentators, but among the general public, the notion is widespread that, in order to keep the economy growing, citizens have a duty, whatever else may happen, to keep on spending.

But is it true? Is there actually something paradoxical about thrift that can make it more a curse than a blessing for society? Here, in ascending level of importance, are five reasons why, in fact, there is no paradox of thrift.

5. Saved money is likely to be productive money.

It is actually possible to save too much. Anyone who is denying his children adequate food or medicine or endangering his own health in order to allocate more to savings is almost certainly saving too much.

As a group, however, Americans have never been at serious risk of oversaving. Over the past eight decades, the personal savings rate in the United States--the difference between earnings and expenditures--averaged about 7 percent. It reached about 11 percent in the early 1980s and then began a long, steep decline. By the time the nation entered the 21st century overleveraged and in debt, the personal savings rate had sunk to zero or below.

In recent months, as the economic horizon has rapidly darkened, the U.S. personal savings rate has soared. Last week the Commerce Department reported it at 5.7 percent, according to the Associated Press. By the end of the year, according to some economists, it may reach 7 or 8 percent. In other words, if they are right, by 2010 Americans may be saving at about the same rate that we've averaged since 1930.

No one would call this dangerous oversaving. On the contrary, even the current modest increase in the savings rate is good for families and the nation. The reason is simple: Savings--money diverted from consumption--are the only source of money for productive investment, and productive investment is the lifeblood of the economy.

By the same token, economists overwhelmingly agree that a high-debt, zero-saving society is one that has put itself at long-term risk. For a time, it may be possible to live the high life on borrowed money. Having other nations largely finance our ever-growing debts may allow us to kick the can down the road while continuing to shop as if there were no tomorrow.

But it's ultimately unsustainable. Over time, a thriving economy and a successful society require citizens who are willing and able to save for the future, and this fundamental fact will not change.

The "savings glut" described by Keynes and others, when the desire to save overwhelms our willingness to invest, may be a theoretical danger, but the weight of evidence suggests that it is not happening today in the United States.

The banking and finance crisis of recent months--which may already be easing--appears at least to some degree to have unnaturally frozen the flow of credit. And there appears to be a hesitancy among many investors. But no one is seriously suggesting that this problem could be solved by returning to the practice of shopping with money we don't have. After all, if that were the solution, there would never have been a crisis in the first place.

According to most analysts, the root of our financial crisis is enormously large, interlocking, and ultimately toxic structures of debt. And if piled-up consumer debt is part of the problem, running up still more consumer debt can hardly be the solution.

In fact, the solution lies in the opposite direction. An 8 or 9 percent personal savings rate in 2010, allowing households to reduce their debt and begin to live within their means, might actually ameliorate the banking crisis, insofar as it would once again position millions of Americans to become investors and wealth-builders over the long run.

More broadly, if we bracket for a moment the immediate and probably short-term failures in our banking system and take a longer view, the danger of a genuine American savings glut--savings in excess of productive investment--appears to be all but nonexistent.

Fundamentally, our economy is wide open and extremely dynamic. We value, and frequently reward, risk-taking and entrepreneurialism. Stand on any American Main Street and you can hardly throw a brick without hitting someone who is itching to start a business, make a new product, try out an idea, risk all to follow a dream. People around the world admire us (and occasionally despise us), and some of them end up coming here, for precisely these reasons. It is unlikely, under any reasonably foreseeable circumstances, that this deep-rooted American characteristic will disappear, or turn into its opposite, such that we suddenly have too many saved dollars chasing too few new challenges and new ideas. In America, saved money typically is productive money.

4. For individuals and families, it's always wise to live within your means.

Consider a 27-year-old woman from Missouri, a graduate of a community college, working as a sales representative for a big greeting card company. She is recently married. Her husband also works in corporate sales. Their annual income is $84,000. They have no children, but hope to start a family soon. And owning a home is one of their dreams.

They eat out a lot. They enjoy travel. Between them, they have five credit cards, with a balance of about $11,500. (A year ago, the unpaid balance was $9,000.) Some months, they try to pay down some of the principal, but for most of the past year, they paid only the minimum. Also, the husband still owes about $16,000 on his student loans. Sometimes, when an unexpected expense arises, his wife borrows money from her parents. Usually she pays them back, but not always. Together, the couple have about $700 in the bank.

Plainly, these two are spending too much. They have good jobs, a reasonable income, and no children, yet they are spending nearly every penny they have on short-term consumption, while slipping further into debt. If this pattern is projected even a few years into the future, they are almost surely looking at a painful financial crisis.

Then suppose the economy turns sour. Their companies are laying off workers and cutting back. The couple both still have their jobs, but they're worried.

As a result, they begin to make changes. The nice vacation they were planning--with the expenses to go on their credit cards--is now on hold. They try to eat out less, to cut back on entertainment, to be more careful with their dollars generally. They are being more responsible--but are they hurting their society by helping themselves in this way? Are they failing to consider, in the economic sphere, their patriotic duty?

It's hard to see how that could be the case. Indeed, most young couples are likely to feel much better about their chances of building a nest if they first build a nest egg. Once people begin to live within their means, moreover, all kinds of productive and pro-social things are likely to happen.

First and foremost, they become richer. That is the purpose of thrift. Not coincidentally, the most beloved and frequently quoted book on thrift in the history of the world, written by Benjamin Franklin, is entitled The Way to Wealth. It's almost a mathematical certainty that if people practice thrift over time--and avoid getting struck by lightning or run over by a truck--they will get richer. In all likelihood, they will get significantly richer.

Second, such savers are actually likely to spend more than people mired in debt. Couples who practice thrift and build wealth over time have more assets and savings, which in turn become productive investments, which in turn promote economic growth and development. Such thrifty couples also tend to pay more taxes. This whole dynamic is good for families and for their society. In fact, if the goal is more stimulative spending, thrift is the main way to get there.

So Americans who are now taking steps to get their financial house in order are not the problem for a troubled economy. They are the solution. No one should chastise them on the grounds that society paradoxically benefits from their overindebtedness. On the contrary, everyone should cheer their newfound thrift and hope that living within one's means becomes prevalent.

3. Governments, not individuals or families, are responsible for any deficit spending needed to moderate economic downturns.

It is true that a sudden drop in consumer spending--that is, in the demand for goods and services--can lead to unemployment, worsening an economic downturn. And in this situation, wise policymakers may wish to engage in deficit spending in order to stimulate demand, boost employment, and generally moderate the effects of the downturn. But this isn't a paradox.

Neoclassical economic theory has long taught that, in a downturn, government may properly engage in deficit spending, just as, in boom years, a wise government builds up a surplus. Keynes himself contributed to this idea. One happy result of this economic model is a balanced budget over the course of the business cycle. Another is a moderating of highs and lows. Just as calculated doses of fiscal restraint help keep the economy from overheating during upturns, so calculated doses of fiscal excess help moderate the effects and duration of downturns.

One can only wish that the Bush administration had respected these norms, instead of blithely running huge budget deficits throughout the recent go-go years. And one can only pray that now, as we confront the worst economic downturn in decades, the far larger deficits planned by the Obama administration are the right amount of federal deficit spending.

But whatever else may be true of deficit spending during downturns, the job must necessarily fall to governments. It makes no sense, from either the individual's or the society's point of view, to urge already over-indebted citizens and families to do anything other than start living within their means, so as to begin building wealth, instead of only consuming and borrowing.

Furthermore, it is far more efficient for the government to borrow than the individual. The U.S. government can borrow money to cover its deficit spending at an interest rate of 2 or 3 percent--a fraction of the 20 percent or more that families pay on credit card debt.

Then, there is what the economist Mancur Olson called the logic of collective action. There are some goals which, even when favored by all as individuals, cannot be achieved through individual action. For example, if one shopkeeper in a big, dirty city stops throwing his garbage into the street, he can have only a slight impact on the overall problem. And if he pays for private garbage removal, his costs will go up while his neighbors' costs remain constant, a development that could ultimately threaten his livelihood. The only real solution is for all the shopkeepers at once to change their behavior. There are many other illustrations of the logic of collective action, and deficit spending to stimulate the economy is one of them.

If, in the spirit of Keynes's famous appeal, a patriotic housewife sallies forth to serve her country by maxing out another credit card, she is like the shopkeeper. Her splurge will hardly affect total consumer spending, though it will make her and her family worse off. Which is why today's patriotic but intelligent housewife will instead sally over to a savings bank or credit union and make a deposit--an action that will almost certainly make her and her family better off and, by helping her move from dependent debtor to independent saver and investor, be good for society.

For these reasons, priming the economic pump in the short term must be done collectively, through the actions of government, instead of individually, through the private overspending of citizens and households. This concept is completely consistent with the thrift ethic, and there is nothing paradoxical about it.

2. Assuming that there is a paradox of thrift encourages waste.

The story is told that Keynes, in a fancy washroom at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington in 1934, instead of taking a single towel to dry his hands, dramatically pushed the entire pile of clean towels to the floor and crumpled them, explaining to his listeners that this way of using towels would do more to reduce unemployment and stimulate the economy than using a single towel.

The story may be apocryphal, but it captures the essence of the alleged paradox of thrift. In this view, it is "Enterprise" that generates wealth--regardless, as Keynes put it, of "whatever may be happening to Thrift." Accordingly, if tossing clean towels onto a dirty floor will generate a bit more "Enterprise" among underemployed hotel workers, then by all means start tossing, and thrift be damned, since it is inactivity that constitutes the ultimate danger. The values traditionally associated with thrift--carefulness, conservation--become a sideshow at best and do harm at worst.

At the center of this argument is the unethical and finally counterproductive encouragement of waste. A great weakness not only of the critique of thrift, but also of much economic analysis, is the dubious claim that every dollar spent on economic "Enterprise" is the equivalent of every other dollar spent on it.

But there is no such equivalence. A dollar spent on bottled water is clearly not as good--not as productive, as wise, as helpful to society--as a dollar spent on a tap water purifier. A dollar spent on a lottery ticket is not as good as a dollar spent on a DVD. A dollar spent on junk food is not as good as a dollar spent on healthy food. And, no, a dollar spent on cleaning needlessly dirtied hotel towels is not as good as a dollar spent on, say, improving service in the hotel restaurant.

This fundamental misconception--the idea that buying stuff is buying stuff is buying stuff, and that all of it is equally valuable to the economy--is harmful wherever it finds expression, but it is particularly harmful in the United States, where we are already dangerously in thrall to the idea that vast amounts of consumption are necessary and good.

Especially in the United States, we need to make more, and better, distinctions about how we spend our money. We are arguably the most wasteful society on the planet. On the one hand, many of us buy amazing amounts of stuff we don't need and that fails to enrich our lives. On the other hand, there are numerous domains of American life--transportation, health care, education, leisure time, and others--that cry out for more, and more prudent, expenditures.

1. Properly understood, "thrift" means the ethic and practice of wise use.

If Keynes had merely insisted that there is a "paradox of saving," that would have been an interesting proposition. But Keynes chose to call it a paradox of thrift. That is a provocation, for "thrift" is a larger and more culturally consequential idea than "saving."

Keynes apparently didn't know this. In A Treatise on Money, he criticized "that voluntary abstinence of individuals from the immediate enjoyment of consumption, which we call Thrift." And then, remember, he insisted "it should be obvious that mere abstinence is not enough by itself to build cities or drain fens."

For Keynes, and countless others who have admired and followed him, thrift is abstinence, plain and simple. It's a wholly negative concept--it means not doing something (not enjoying the goods of consumption). It connotes passivity, quietude, voluntary withdrawal. That's why Keynes could contrast "Thrift," which for him means inactivity, with "Enterprise," which for him means activity.

But the root of "thrift" is "thrive," and a thrifty person is one who thrives.

Thrift connotes growing, flourishing, spreading out. A commonly repeated maxim from thrift's heyday as an American public value is that thrift makes two blades of grass grow where only one grew before. There are plants that are commonly called "thrift." The celebrated 1911 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica--the very edition that Keynes would have used in the 1920s--thus explains that "there are several species of plants, such as the sea-pink, Armeria maritima, or March rosemary (Statice) which from their vigorous growth are often termed 'thrift.' "

Thrift connotes industry, hard work, prosperity. The goal of thrift is to gain and enjoy the good things of life. Says the 16th-century poet John Lyly: "Thy heart's thirst is satisfied with thy hand's thrift." The great apostle of thrift Benjamin Franklin says: "Be industrious and frugal, and you will be rich." When Franklin similarly advises that "Industry need not wish," he is offering a strategy for getting one's wishes: Be industrious. That strategy, he tells us, "consists very much in Thrift." Franklin openly states that "wealth is not his that has it, but his that enjoys it."

Thrift connotes abundance. Thrifty people, as we've seen, tend to earn and spend much more than thriftless people. Says the 16th-century poet and courtier Sir Philip Sidney: "Thrift is the fuel of magnificence."

The thrift ethic is a secular expression of the religious principle of stewardship. The main idea is that we are not the owners of our wealth, but rather the trustees, who are therefore ethically obligated to use our wealth wisely and carefully, for our benefit and for the benefit of others. The Puritan divine Cotton Mather, who strongly influenced Franklin, writes in Essays to Do Good, published in 1710: "This may be said of all our estates: what God gives us, is not given for ourselves, but, 'for the Lord.' " A quarter-century later, Franklin, in Poor Richard's Almanac, omits the theology and puts it this way: "The noblest question in the world is What good may I do in it?"

Thrift connotes saving, carefulness in spending, sustainability, and conservation. While such capacities do not define thrift, they are integral to the larger concept of wise use. Careful spending, for example, as we learn from several old writers, is "the handmaiden of generosity." Franklin constantly emphasizes the importance of frugality. For many decades during the 20th century, U.S. and British mutual savings banks gave away to their depositors small metal "Thrift Banks" (to save coins in) and pamphlet-style "Books of Thrift" (full of tips for Mom and Dad about household budgeting). A character called "Uncle Thrift," the star of an American children's book published in 1923, raps: We will be a thrifty nation, / When we all learn conservation.

Put the pieces together, and the concept of thrift turns out to be a sophisticated call for the ethics and practice of wise use. Thrift is the art of making the wisest use of all that we have--time, money, possessions, our health, and our society's natural resources--to promote both our own flourishing and the social good. The concepts most contrary to thrift are idleness and waste.

As the countless American and British advocates of thrift over the past several centuries knew, the notions of "mere abstinence" and "inactivity" can't remotely sum up the thrift ethic. When it comes to understanding what thrift is, Keynes and company are not even close. Indeed, it is only by misconceiving thrift that they have been able to foist a pernicious concept on the public mind.

To most people, the phrase "paradox of thrift" means that thrift can be a bad thing. The very existence of the phrase invites us to believe that personal restraint can be harmful and personal irresponsibility can be socially beneficial, that wastefulness is not so bad after all, and that what appears to be wise for me and my family can actually hurt society. It is past time to jettison such bankrupt thoughts and put the "paradox of thrift" out of its misery once and for all.

David Blankenhorn is president of the Institute for American Values and a co-editor of Franklin's Thrift: The Lost History of an American Virtue.

Tuesday, June 02, 2009

The Gitmo Myth and the Torture Canard

On January 21, 2009, President Barack Obama issued his first executive order: He was closing the detention center at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba and calling a halt to the military commissions created in late 2001 to try terrorist suspects detained there. Like the startling opening chord of a Beethoven symphony, Obama’s action was intended to herald a new tone in America’s “war on terror” and a restoration of America’s moral standing. The response was electric. The facility at Guantánamo (Gitmo for short) had become “America’s most notorious prison,” as Fox News put it. In the minds of many, it was the American equivalent of the Bastille or the KGB’s Lubyanka prison: a dungeon used to isolate, intimidate, and torture generally hapless inmates, many of whom were innocent of any crime against the United States. Dana Priest of the Washington Post took to the paper’s front page to proclaim joyously that “with the stroke of his pen,” Obama had “effectively declared an end to the ‘war on terror,’ as President George W. Bush had defined it.” Now Obama could begin the process of rehabilitating America’s image around the world, the very image Gitmo had done so much to blacken.

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Then several strange things happened. Obama’s order “closing” Gitmo actually left it open for a year, ostensibly until new arrangements could be made for the 240 or so inmates still detained there—though Obama admitted privately it might have to stay open longer than that. Later, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that, far from being “the Bermuda Triangle of human rights” that Human Rights Watch’s Wendy Patten had dubbed it, Gitmo was in full compliance with the humane-treatment provisions of the Geneva Convention. Meanwhile, the military commissions, which Human Rights Watch and others groups had denounced as a travesty of justice, were only being suspended for 120 days, pending a review—and, indeed, following that review, will be reinstated almost exactly as they were before.

If one adds to this mix:
• the twelve separate inquiries into the abuses alleged by critics and former detainees at Gitmo that found no evidence of those abuses taking place;
• the revelation during the release earlier this year of the so-called “torture memos” that waterboarding and other harsh interrogation techniques had been applied to exactly three suspects in the course of eight years and had never been standard operating practice at Gitmo;
• the evaluation by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point that 73 percent of Gitmo detainees were “a demonstrated threat” to Americans;
• and, finally, the fact that the detention facility was created in the wake of a declaration by Congress in September 2001 that “all necessary and appropriate force” should be used “against those nations, organizations, or persons” [emphasis added] responsible for the attacks of September 11;
—one may be permitted to wonder why, exactly, the pressure to close the prison facility has been so intense and long-lasting.

The standard argument is that the public shift in attitude toward Gitmo was gradual, and reflected a growing disillusionment with the war on terror as the sordid details of how George W. Bush and his assistants chose to wage it came out, including the supposed secret use of torture. Once the detention center had become a cesspool of human-rights abuse, the evil spawned there then seeped into other facilities where prisoners in the Bush war on terror were being held, most notoriously the Iraqi prison at Abu Ghraib. In 2004, former Vice President Al Gore announced that Abu Ghraib “was not the result of random acts by a ‘few bad apples’: it was the natural consequence of the Bush administration policy” of retaining and interrogating inmates at Gitmo.

What this account and others like it fail to take into consideration are the aggressive and unending efforts of a cadre of lawyers, activists, left-leaning Democrats in Congress, and civil libertarians against the facility, its purpose, its goal, and its existence. These efforts began even before it was opened, in November 2001, and continue to this day. The anti-Gitmo forces worked tirelessly to shape the public perception that Gitmo was the red-hot center of an aggressive policy approach that led the leftist financier George Soros to declare: “The biggest terrorist in the world is George W. Bush.”

The enemies of Bush and Gitmo have succeeded brilliantly. But in so doing, they have done grave violence to the truth about the Guantánamo Bay facility, have aided in the release of prisoners who have since committed acts of terrorism outside the United States, and may yet succeed in having Barack Obama’s government release young men with terrifying ambitions for murder and mass destruction onto the soil of the United States.

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WHY GITMO?

In October 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan to crush the al-Qaeda terrorists who had free run of the country and the Taliban government that was housing them. Within weeks, the U.S. military found itself holding tens of thousands of prisoners, including foreign al-Qaeda fighters who had been training in terrorist camps in the Afghan hinterland.

The tale would later be told that many of these prisoners were hapless shepherds, farmers, and even tourists caught up in the fighting, and that the Northern Alliance, the Afghan guerrilla group with which the United States was allied in the fight against the Taliban, was handing over innocent men whom they falsely dubbed al-Qaeda members in order to collect a money bounty.

In point of fact, the military captured more than 70,000 men and put every one through a rigorous screening process. Ten thousand were released immediately. By the time the military had completed its work, only 800 remained in custody. These were the ones they had deemed hard-core trained terrorists who could not be released without running the risk they would rejoin the battle. The question was what to do with them.

From the beginning, the Department of Defense and its head, Donald Rumsfeld, were deeply reluctant to take on the job of detaining these prisoners who, unlike normal POWs, fought for no country, wore no uniforms, and had systematically broken the rules of war. In a conventional war, prisoners are held to keep them from being returned to the fight. The problem here was that there was no conventional battlefield; in a war of terror, a combatant can theoretically strike anywhere in the world. It was not clear to anyone what was to be done with this new model of stateless combatant. Rumsfeld “hated the idea of being a jailer,” as his aide Douglas Feith relates in his memoir, War and Decision, in large measure owing to the fact that they were not automatically covered under the Geneva Convention. Deciding how they were to treated or tried posed immense legal difficulties that no lawyer at the Department of Defense was eager to take on.

Finding a place to put them proved the easy part. In 1987, a prison had been set up for the United States Southern Command at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The site was a military location and therefore secure—so secure that eventually the CIA transferred its “high-value” al-Qaeda detainees like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed there. It was not in a Muslim country, which lessened the possibility of a prison break or other political complications. Finally, it was under United States control but not on United States soil—which, according to a 1950 Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager, meant that prisoners could be lawfully brought under American custody from various international locations to be detained and processed without the involvement of civil courts.

Gitmo was never meant to be a prison where inmates were to serve sentences for crimes. It was, in the words of a Defense Department document, a detention facility set up in order to prevent “enemy combatants from continuing the fight against the US. and its partners in the war on terror.” Its goals were military and tactical, not juridical or penal. Still, the conditions under which these unconventional prisoners were to be held did involve questions.

The questions were especially complex because the facility became a place where military, FBI, and CIA interrogators would all become involved in questioning al-Qaeda suspects to determine who was guilty of involvement in the 9/11 plot and whether other attacks were being planned or were imminent. Since all these agencies operate under different legal strictures, sorting out who could do what was immensely difficult.

In the end, addressing all these legal questions fell to the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), then led by John Yoo.

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THE MEMOS

Yoo was tasked with providing a set of ground rules for detention, interrogation, and trial of the detainees. The Department of Defense had wanted to treat these as three separate issues. However, Yoo and the OLC lawyers believed they had to be handled as parts of a single policy—especially since at the same time they were also setting guidelines on how the CIA would be allowed to question suspects that fell into its hands.

Those rules and memos were assembled over the course of many months bridging 2001 and 2002, in the immediate shadow of 9/11 with the possibility of a second massive attack looming on the horizon. Later, the press would brand them “torture memos,” and the Obama administration’s decision to release the full texts of those memos in April 2009 fed the frenzy. However, they could just as well be branded “anti-torture memos.” Yoo and his colleagues used them to define the boundaries at which interrogation of unwilling and uncooperative prisoners would cross over into the category of torture. Once those boundaries were breached, any action would be illegal under United States law and international treaties, including the 1994 United Nations Convention Against Torture. They looked to practices by Israeli as well as British intelligence services that had undergone legal scrutiny in their own countries, and they also considered historical norms about torture since the Middle Ages.

The OLC understood as well as any of its later critics that torture—the cruel and needless infliction of pain in order to dominate and control others or to exact confessions or information—was barbarism. It was precisely in order to prevent such barbarism that the memos were drawn up in the first place. It was also why then, and later, army and CIA interrogators tried to avoid even drawing close to those boundaries without explicit authorization.

Critics further assert that the OLC memos “denied” Geneva Convention status to the al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners at Gitmo. One key lawyer, Michael Ratner, has claimed that by “ignoring” the Geneva Convention in this way, the Justice Department rules were in “violation of half a century of U.S. precedent.” This is incorrect. Yoo and the OLC were not making policy in the memos. They were attempting to describe the law as it stood. As Yoo has pointed out, it was up to the president and the president alone to decide whether the Gitmo prisoners should be treated in accordance with Geneva Convention standards (which he did, in 2002). The prisoners in no way fit the standard of “lawful combatant” as defined by the Geneva Convention’s Common Article 3 and therefore could not automatically be accorded the treatment the Convention required. Indeed, because they were not in uniform and were fighting under no flag, the rules applying specifically to that category could not apply without violating the sense of the Convention itself—although that did not mean they could be treated in any way the Gitmo guards and commandant saw fit.

There were other practical reasons for refusing to treat the Gitmo prisoners like German or Italian POWs in World War II, or somewhat later, Iraqi soldiers captured in Operation Iraqi Freedom (no one, then or later, ever suggested that the Geneva Convention, including Common Article 3, did not apply to prisoners captured in Iraq). Al-Qaeda recruits are trained in the arts of conspiracy, assassination, and murder. A system of open barracks, as in a conventional POW camp, would allow detainees to organize plots, even rebellions, within the compounds (organizing riots in a POW camp is a violation of Common Article 3 of the Convention), and to take vengeance on their own number who were suspected of confessing or cooperating with American authorities. Detention in separate cells, as in a conventional prison, seemed the only way to overcome this logistical nightmare.

The rules on Gitmo detention and on interrogation constituted a valiant attempt to deal with an unprecedented legal situation. The same was true of the system of military “commissions” or tribunals for trying suspects at Gitmo. Here the Justice Department largely followed the precedent of tribunals used by the American military during World War II, and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1942 decision Ex Parte Quirin.

Again, critics of the tribunals would accuse Yoo and the Bush administration of trying to make an end run around the United States criminal-justice system by establishing a separate judicial review process for terror suspects and turning Gitmo into a secret offshore detention haven outside the scrutiny of the American justice system. In fact, Yoo and his colleagues were trying to protect the American legal system from stepping into a political-military minefield. Imagine that the Gitmo terrorists had been put into the standard criminal-justice system, with its time-consuming rules about due process, habeas corpus, and countless appeals. Imagine, further, that in the course of all this there had been a second major attack like 9/11, or an al-Qaeda-inspired riot occurred in a U.S. prison that had involved the taking or murdering of hostages. There would have been immense public pressure for the administration to “do something,” to bend or break normal rules in the interest of swift justice. That highly plausible scenario, made reality, would have threatened the integrity of the American justice system. The commissions were intended as a prophylactic means of protecting the American legal system from an unprecedented situation it was not designed to manage.

The plan backfired. The enemies of the Bush White House and the war on terror were working on their own political agenda, involving an attack on the Gitmo system through the courts.

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ENTER STAGE LEFT

When President Bush announced in November 2001 the establishment of the detention center and plans for military commissions to try cases, Michael Ratner of the Center for Constitutional Rights was furious. “The idea that you could pick up people anywhere in the world and hold them forever without a trial is outrageous,” he later told the magazine Mother Jones. Ratner immediately began organizing an effort to offer legal counsel to the first detainees, and organized teams of attorneys working pro bono from some of Washington’s largest law firms to bring suit on behalf of the detainees.

Ratner is a veteran of the ideological wars inside the United States. The Center for Constitutional Rights was founded by the late William Kunstler, who had served as defense attorney for the Chicago Seven, the Black Panthers, and other violent radical groups. Ratner himself had been at the head of the National Lawyers Guild, once a Stalinist front group, before representing Fidel Castro, members of Hamas, and Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind sheikh who organized the original bombing of the World Trade Center back in 1993. One of Ratner’s colleagues, Lynne Stewart, was eventually convicted of providing material aid to Rahman while acting as an officer of the court. Ratner publicly defended Stewart’s actions, and was a dedicated foe of the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Ratner’s allies in the fight for the detainees included Islamist lobbying groups willing to spread the notion that the Gitmo detainees were victims of racial and religious discrimination; liberal lawyers at prestigious Washington firms who had been taught by their law professors that the law’s role is to effect social and political change and who wished to do something more meaningful than work on corporate mergers; and eventually a Democratic party understandably looking for an issue it could use to undermine public support for George Bush (running in the mid-80s in early 2002) and get them back in the political game.

In February 2002 Ratner filed his first petition for habeas corpus for a British-born Gitmo detainee named Shafiq Rasul—a petition that would have fateful consequences two years later. At the time, however, the focus of Ratner and his allies was not torture or the interrogations at Gitmo. Instead, they worked to plant the idea in the public’s mind that most, if not all, of these inmates might be innocent victims, picked up on the battlefield by mistake.

The inmates themselves were happy to oblige. Shafiq Rasul, for example, told Ratner and anyone who would listen that he was no terrorist. He was an innocent tourist whom the Taliban had abducted while he was traveling in Afghanistan, and that during the American invasion he had been forced to take up an AK-47 to use in self-defense. Rasul’s story and similar ones told by two other Gitmo captives born in the English town of Tipton, Ruhal Ahmed and Afiq Iqal (later known as the Tipton Three), became the centerpiece of Ratner’s campaign to open the gates at Gitmo. Their picture adorns his 2007 book, The Trial of Donald Rumsfeld.

Clearly, Ratner insisted, an injustice had been done to these and other foreign nationals caught in the American net after the war in Afghanistan. The fact that Bush had excluded Gitmo from normal judicial review meant that the innocent were bound to suffer, while the remote location of Gitmo ensured that they were left to the mercy of their jailers.

Ratner’s portrait of Gitmo’s detainees was wildly off the mark. But it did reflect the fact that, in its early months, conditions at Gitmo were chaotic. The population of the naval base had swelled from 2,000 to 10,000, among them military personnel, FBI, CIA, Army as well as Drug Enforcement Agency interrogators, doctors, Arab translators, and Muslim chaplains, and of course, the detainees themselves. One of the first structures in the prison camp was a trailer for the International Commission for the Red Cross, which had full access to the detainees and collected mail to be sent to their relatives.

New soldiers and units were constantly rotating through. No one had yet properly defined how Gitmo would function as both a detention and an interrogation facility. In addition, there were no rules on how to punish inmates who attacked their guards or otherwise violated camp rules. There was, and never has been, a disciplinary system for prisoners at Gitmo. To this day prisoners are not punished for their crimes or offenses, even when they attack guards or pelt them with feces.

In fact, before Major General Geoffrey Miller took charge as commandant in November 2002, Gitmo was, according to one eyewitness, “an island of divided loyalties and waning morale.” The environment had grown so stale and hermetic that it became a breeding ground of rumor about unorthodox and bizarre interrogation tactics, including inmates who claimed they were being slapped, shouted at, or subjected to loud music; interrogators pretending to defecate on the Koran; and female interrogators sitting on detainees’ laps in order to humiliate them, or splashing them with red ink pretending it was menstrual blood. Every one of these was investigated and proved false, but the rumors were passed along by FBI interrogators in memos that expressed concern about Gitmo interrogation tactics being used by personnel working for other cabinet agencies. They seemed to verify the picture painted by Ratner and others that the facility was reeling out of control.

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THREE CATEGORIES

In point of fact, the main problem was that Gitmo was proving an ineffective facility when it came to uncovering intelligence. Given the hardened nature of the terrorists being held there, and the urgency of getting information from them, an experienced Army interrogator named Paul Rester (who arrived at Gitmo in 2002) had assumed that the “gloves would be off” in interrogation tactics. To his shock, he found the rules were stricter even than the Army field manual’s: “It was a much more restrictive environment than anywhere else I’ve conducted interrogations.” Prisoners were allowed to defy their questioners and treat them with contempt, even as FBI and Army interrogators were often working at cross-purposes.

Perhaps the best case study was that of Muhammad el-Qahtani, a Saudi national caught by U.S. forces on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan in December 2001. Like other al-Qaeda operatives, Qahtani claimed that he was an innocent man who had only been visiting Afghanistan to buy and sell falcons. Interest in Qahtani changed abruptly in July 2002, when the FBI learned that he was the same Qahtani who had been denied entry at Orlando Airport on a flight from Canada on August 4, 2001—and that Muhammad Atta, mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, had been waiting at Orlando Airport that same day.

Suddenly deemed a “high-value” detainee, Qahtani was moved on orders of the Navy to its brig on the base for isolation. There the FBI took charge and for 30 days carried on a desultory interrogation with its usual, buttoned-down, fully Miranda-warning-inspired style of criminal investigation—and got nowhere.

After thirty days, the Army stepped in and took charge. The FBI was furious at its removal from the case, and its investigators sent e-mails decrying the military’s attempts at breaking Qahtani’s will, which included yelling, calling him names, subjecting him to sleep deprivation and loud music, and duct-taping his cell shut. “It was stupid and ineffective,” Paul Rester later said. “But it wasn’t torture or abuse.”

However, one FBI agent saw the guards bring a growling dog into the interrogation room, which he assumed was being used to intimidate Qahtani—although subsequent investigation showed that dogs at Gitmo were used to escort prisoners back and forth to their cells, not to threaten them. Since that detail was included in the FBI e-mails, and later leaked, the idea that dogs were used to abuse prisoners would become a fixture in the false portrait that was being painted of the goings-on at Gitmo.

Interrogators were still getting nowhere, so on October 11, 2002, the head of the Southern Command, General James Hill, was asked to approve an enhanced interrogation schedule, divided into three categories of coercion beyond those covered in the U.S. Army field manual:

Category I, yelling and deception.

Category II, stress positions for up to four hours, light deprivation, removal of clothing, shaving of facial hair (very shaming to a Muslim male), and exploitation of fear phobias, including fear of dogs.

Category III, “the use of scenarios” to convince the detainee that his life is in danger, including waterboarding.

On November 15, against FBI objections, Hill approved the use of Categories I and II, but not Category III. He also approved a plan for applying them to Qahtani by degrees on a thirty-day schedule beginning on November 23. On December 2, Rumsfeld weighed in with his own authorization, which, again, did not include waterboarding. Rumsfeld had his doubts in any case, and on January 15 rescinded his authorization pending further review.

Still, that proved to be enough time to break Qahtani. He was subjected to 20-hour interrogation sessions, being tied to a dog leash (no actual dogs were involved), having water poured continually on his head (but no waterboarding), while women’s clothes were dropped on his face and a bra strapped across his clothed chest. These and other humiliations, including turning up the air-conditioning to uncomfortable levels, did result in Qahtani’s brief hospitalization in early December with brachyocardia. However, none remotely approached the definition of torture defined by the OLC’s August 2002 memo as administering physical pain equal to the intensity “accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death,” or psychological harm “lasting for months or even years.”

By then, Qahtani had confessed that he worked for al Qaeda. One by one, without hesitation, he picked out pictures of all nineteen of the 9/11 hijackers and called out their names—and admitted that he, not Zacarias Moussaoui, had been slated to be the twentieth hijacker. He also revealed that the true mastermind of the attack was Osama bin Laden’s deputy Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Qahtani also fingered another Saudi al-Qaeda operative, Adnan el-Shukrijumah, who was in the United States organizing another 9/11-style attack for the summer of 2004. Khalid Mohammed’s subsequent capture in Pakistan in March 2003 revealed still more details which, we now know, enabled the Bush administration to foil a second wave of suicide attacks directed at Los Angeles.

Whether Qahtani’s interrogation constituted “torture” might be a matter of debate, but not, it seems, to the new Obama administration. For according to an argument advanced by Obama’s Justice Department in May regarding the possibility that the concentration-camp guard John Demjanjuk would be tortured were he to be deported to Germany, the Qahtani interrogation could not be judged to have risen to the standard of torture because meeting that standard would have required “his prospective torturer [to] have the motive or purpose” of inflicting extreme pain and suffering. That was certainly not the case with Qahtani.

By any standard, his interrogation had also yielded valuable, actionable intelligence that saved American lives. It also established two unquestionable facts about Gitmo. The first was that coerced interrogations were the extreme exception, not standard practice, at the facility. The other was that Rumsfeld and the Bush administration were extremely reluctant to endorse any of these techniques, to the point of overriding the wishes of their own officers in the field, and that the administration was prepared to withdraw permission for enhanced techniques, up to and including waterboarding, almost as soon as they were granted.

However, the leaked FBI memos allowed critics to obfuscate both these points. They felt free to claim that the extraordinary measures taken against Qahtani were standard practice at Gitmo for all detainees; and that far from being reluctant to use these techniques even within the guidelines set out by the OLC, the Defense Department couldn’t wait to use them. Still, those counterclaims gained little traction until the revelations about Abu Ghraib broke in the spring of 2004.

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ABU GHRAIB

It is important to remember that the exposure of the abuses at Abu Ghraib came not from a reporter or human-rights advocate or international agency, but from within the Department of Defense itself. It was the classic case of a government agency learning about abuses and violations of specific guidelines, thoroughly investigating the abuse, alerting higher-ups of the problem, and then dismissing and punishing those responsible—while developing additional guidelines to prevent it from happening again. The Abu Ghraib investigation, in short, was government at its most responsive and effective.

All the same, it was a propaganda gold mine for Ratner and his allies. Now they could attach a series of disturbing visual images to their stories about treatment of Gitmo detainees—in fact, in The Trial of Donald Rumsfeld, Ratner has exterior pictures of prisoners at Gitmo’s Camp X-Ray followed immediately by interior snapshots from Abu Ghraib, as if they were in actual sequence. The implication was that what happened at Abu Ghraib was normal procedure in Gitmo.

By that spring, also, Democrats were looking for a campaign issue to derail President Bush’s reelection chances. The Bush administration’s “culpability” for Abu Ghraib was made to order. “Shamefully,” Senator Edward Kennedy said on the floor of the Senate, “we now learn that Saddam’s torture chambers [are] reopened under new management: U.S. management.” Reading the FBI memos in light of the Abu Ghraib pictures, Senator Dick Durbin compared the Gitmo jailors to Nazis and the Soviets in the gulag, henchmen of some “mad regime—Pol Pot and others—who have no concern for human beings.”

So Democrats were quick to embrace the thesis put forward by Seymour Hersh in his book Chain of Command: Even if Bush and Rumsfeld hadn’t actually ordered the abuses at Abu Ghraib, still, their “hard” approach to the war on terror, denying Gitmo suspects American-style civil rights and allowing coercive interrogations, had created an atmosphere in which torture was condoned and even common. Hersh attempted to make this explicit by pointing out that Gitmo’s former commandant, Geoffrey Miller, had been sent to Iraq to advise on interrogations in August 2003. Here was clear evidence, Hersh and others claimed, that the Bush administration had wanted to extend Gitmo’s “reign of terror” into occupied Iraq. But the opposite was true. Miller had been sent to Iraq precisely to make sure that American prisoner detention facilities there lived up to the rigorous standards applied at Gitmo under Miller’s tenure.



The Gitmo Myth and the Torture Canard

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Footnotes

1This was demonstrated by the case of Camp Bucca in southern Iraq, where inmates used their mosque (deemed off limits to U.S. personnel) to dig an escape tunnel and build a cache of homemade weapons, including concrete shards and bombs built from feces, socks, and flammable hand sanitizer. When the tunnel was discovered in March 2005, prisoners rioted for four days, injuring several U.S. soldiers; ultimately infantry units and a Black Hawk helicopter had to be used to restore order. As Kyndra Rotunda relates in her book, Honor Bound, the Camp Bucca incident, almost completely ignored by the American press, weighed heavily on the minds of Gitmo staff.

2 Meanwhile, the 2004 commission headed by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger cleared the Defense Department and Bush administration of any responsibility for what had happened at Abu Ghraib.

3 According to Richard Clarke’s memoirs, Against All Enemies, Vice President Al Gore cheered them on. Clarke tells the story of Gore coming to a 1993 NSC meeting where the idea of “extraordinary rendition” was proposed. While White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler had his doubts, Gore had none. “That’s a no brainer,” Clarke says Gore declared, “of course it’s a violation of international law. The guy is a terrorist. Go grab his ass.”

Sunday, May 31, 2009

Testing

One of the advantages of having Barack Obama as president of the hyperpower, is that it puts his great mass of fans, in America and abroad, in the position of having to think about real problems. It turns out the solution to each of them was more complicated than "get rid of Bush." The world does not spontaneously change when the president changes.

North Korea, Iran, and a seriously unstable Pakistan continue to present plausible and pressing nuclear threats. Islamist terrorists continue to seek soft targets right around the world; and the fanatic Islamist ideology continues to win adherents, even in New York prison cells. For that matter, problems of disease, poverty, petty tyranny and oppression, with or without war, continue to afflict our species, regardless of who comes and goes from an office in Washington. America's allies become no more likely to pull their weight, and no less apt to strike self-serving rhetorical postures.

The banking problems, the environmental and other notional issues, must be seen in a new light. It is no use just inventing bogeymen, and accusing them of imaginary crimes. Suddenly the facts matter, and the advantages of pretending disappear. Can we really afford to drain the whole economy to douse a financial brush fire? Can we afford to demonize the whole wealth-creating class? If the "threat of global warming" is (as becomes increasingly obvious) a gigantic imposture, can we afford to remain hostage to the environmentalists' perpetually escalating demands?

The farce over Guantanamo illustrates all of this. From a grand initial "symbolic gesture" -- a promise to vindicate "human rights" by closing this offshore holding tank for the world's most dangerous terrorists -- the Obama administration learned why Guantanamo was set up, and why each decision was made, right down to waterboarding three of the inmates to get urgent information on the next terrorist hits.

The Guantanamo arrangements were a bad solution to an intractable problem, but all the other solutions were worse. And now, Obama's "symbolic gesture" must confront Dick Cheney's hard facts, and the new president may begin to learn what is wrong with symbolic gestures.

The Obama administration has taken a pass on confronting Iran's nuclear threat to annihilate Israel: the president publicly giving the ayatollahs until the end of the year to do what they will, after his symbolic offer of direct talks was mostly spurned. Instead, he will focus on getting concessions out of Israel, in the hope that a cosmetic "two state solution" can change the optics throughout the Middle East. The clock continues ticking.

But in North Korea, no opportunity remains for postponement.

On Monday, the North Koreans performed a controlled underground explosion of a nuclear device of up to 20 kilotons. This was their second nuclear test: the first, in October 2006, was for a device of less than one kiloton. The first test went badly; this latest appears to have gone well. From these facts alone we see that their technicians have made immense progress.

Last month, Pyongyang tested another long-range ballistic missile, also in defiance of all the agreements it had made with the Bush administration, and its neighbours. We thus have a rogue state indifferent to world opinion that is rapidly acquiring the means to alter the geopolitical map by its ability to incinerate a city such as Tokyo.

What, then, is the symbolic gesture that will make them stop? For the North Korean politburo remains unmoved by the president's various expressions of grave concern.

The policy of the Bush administration, prior to 2007, was to apply real and increasing pressure on the regime, from cutting off aid to intruding upon its international financial transactions. This persuaded North Korea to make the agreements they have now comprehensively broken. The U.S. State Department remains in love with "engagement" -- it is their professional myopia -- but the time comes when a president has to act.

In the case of North Korea, that time is now. America's new president has the support, potentially, of a Chinese government that is seriously distressed by Pyongyang's behaviour. He has a Japanese government that never doubted the need for consistent, decisive action. And in Lee Myung-bak, he has a South Korean president who is a fully-declared U.S. ally, who enjoys popular support for confronting the crisis, and who appreciates the failure of past symbolic gestures. Therefore President Obama has an unusually promising opportunity to show that he is not a chump.

He has indeed what may be his make-or-break opportunity to show not only North Korea, but through what he does there, Iran and the rest of the world, that he can move beyond symbolic gestures. But he must take steps that visibly change North Korea's behaviour to pull this off.